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PROLEGOMENA TO HISTORY

THE RELATION OF HISTORY TO LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE

BY

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INTRODUCTION

In an address on "The Study of History," delivered at the University of Glasgow in 1884, Principal Caird set in a clear light the problem that lies before History as a university study. "The expediency," he said, "of introducing the study of history into a university curriculum turns upon the question whether history is capable of scientific treatment. Knowledge which has not yet been elevated out of the domain of facts and details, which has not submitted itself to the grasp of principles, or become in some measure illuminated and harmonized by the presence of law, cannot, I suppose, be regarded as a fit instrument of the higher education."

To this challenge there has been no adequate response on the part of those who are professionally engaged in the study and teaching of history. In England and America it is only on rare
occasions that the professor of history seems disposed to lay aside the presentation of assured fact in order to consider the nature of the foundation upon which his constructions rest. Hence it is that most of our contributions to historical theory are to be found in the inaugural lectures of university professors and the presidential addresses of historical societies and associations. Possibly the subjects of these communications, which have much in common, are considered too general and debatable to be offered in regular courses of instruction; possibly it is only upon such important occasions that the scholar may look for an audience sufficiently expert to justify him in taking up problems of admitted complexity, and it may be that the speaker welcomes the opportunity to express his matured convictions. It is evident, indeed, that these are not perfunctory speeches; they are, without exception, informed by a spirit of earnestness, which, however, not infrequently cloaks hesitating thought. In a measure all these pronouncements, it must be admitted, are excursions into unfamiliar territory, and betray an air of having been written under pressure, rather than of being the spontaneous expression of familiar ideas. However this may be, the fact remains that the English-speaking representatives of historical scholarship, when called upon to stand out for a moment from among their fellows, find that the particulars which they themselves have been investigating can not be relied upon to make a general appeal, and so it comes that cherished researches are temporarily neglected for the brief advocacy of some view of the nature and utility of history. Restricted to such situations, it is not remarkable that the consideration of the fundamental problems of historical study has shown but little vitality during the last fifty years. Assertion evokes rejoinder—Freeman will have none of Stubbs, and Firth improves upon Bury—and each latest speaker is sensitive to the lapses of his immediate predecessors. Thus the problems, lightly touched, remain, like politics and religion, subjects on which every man is presumed to have an opinion, but which the taste of the moment places outside the pale of direct and sustained discussion.
Among historical scholars there still is disagreement as to whether history is or may become a science, though there seems to be unanimity of opinion that some part, at least, of historical work is "scientific." "Whether," said Stubbs, "we look at the dignity of the subject-matter, or at the nature of the mental exercise which it requires, or at the inexhaustible field over which the pursuit ranges, History, the knowledge of the adventures, the development, the changeful career, the varied growths, the ambitions, aspirations, and, if you like, the approximating destinies of mankind, claims a place second to none in the roll of sciences." Bury would have us remember always that though history "may supply material for literary art or philosophical speculation, she is herself simply a science, no less and no more." Villari, after passing in review the opinions held on the question, reaches the conclusion that "History can never be converted into a philosophical system nor into a natural or mathematical science. Nor would it even be possible to attain that purpose by forcing it to use methods appertaining to other studies." Among philosophers and men of science opinion on the subject is equally varied. "A science of history in the true sense of the term," Jevons said, "is an absurd notion. . . . In human affairs, the smallest causes may produce the greatest effects, and the real application of scientific method is out of the question." Sidgwick did not "consider History a Science, so far as it is merely concerned with presenting particular events in chronological order."

The uncertainty of the situation is shown further by the criticisms which, while condemning the present methods of historical scholars, express confidence in the possibility of a

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science of history. Karl Pearson remarks that "historians have assumed . . . that history is all facts and no factors." He himself thinks that "natural history, the evolution of organic nature, is at the basis of human history," and that "only when history is interpreted in this sense of natural history does it pass from the sphere of narrative and become science." Hobhouse, looking beyond existing limitations, believes that "we can conceive as not indefinitely remote a stage of knowledge in which the human species should come to understand its own development, its history, conditions, and possibilities, and on the basis of such an understanding should direct its own future."

It will be evident from the conflict of opinion thus exhibited that we are here confronted with a problem at once of difficulty and importance. Mere expression of opinion cannot, however, advance the discussion further—the only way open is to institute an inquiry into the nature and characteristics, on the one hand, of Science, and, on the other, of History.

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THE METHOD OF SCIENCE

What distinguishes the work of contemporary physicists or biologists from that of historical scholars is the critical self-consciousness of the former in regard to the mental processes involved in research and discovery. Scientific methodology deals primarily with the psychological analysis of the investigator's mode of thought. The purpose of this analysis, as Stallo remarked, is to eliminate from science its latent metaphysical elements, to foster the spirit of experimental investigation, and to accredit the great endeavor of scientific research to gain a sure foothold on solid empirical ground. Science recognizes that all investigation proceeds in the human mind; it takes account of the fact that the order in which ideas associate themselves differs radically from the order manifested by phenomena in external nature; and it acts upon the principle that only by maintaining a constant surveillance over what goes on in our minds is it possible to determine what goes on outside.

"Natural laws are formulae which express the constant relations existing between phenomena, as distinguished from association of ideas in the subjective consciousness."  

"Now the principle of arrangement in the actual world, i.e., in nature, is not logical, but it is a kind of divine confusion, and whenever we destroy this we step out of the region of the natural into that of the artificial."  

Historical investigators, on the other hand, have made a policy of ignoring these preliminaries in favor of getting at once to the

"facts" themselves. There are, however, no shortcuts to knowledge, and historical inquiry, which may prove more arduous in the long run than its obvious interest would suggest, has suffered from the neglect of inquiries that have been found necessary in other fields. How far History is from making use of the recognized methods of scientific investigation may be inferred from its current dictum that historical scholarship must confine itself at present to the collection of facts, so that from these, in an undefined future, the "laws" of history may be formulated. It may be true that every science starts from a basis of ascertained fact and looks to the discovery of "laws" as the goal of its endeavors, but it is a commonplace of modern science that the collection of facts does not of itself lead to the discovery of "laws."

"Malgré tous les progrès accomplis, nous sommes encore dans une période de préparation, d'élaboration des matériaux qui serviront plus tardé à construire des édifices historiques plus vastes."  

"Still in our little day we can do something. We can at least make ready the way for those who are to supplant us, and we may even do somewhat towards the more pious work of prolonging for some small space the posthumous lives of those who went before us."  

"What we ask of the historian, it is said, is, by careful investigation and impartial weighing of contemporary and other evidence, to put us in possession of the facts as they actually occurred at any given time and place. The future may be the field for conjecture and speculation as to the course of events, but history, as has been recently said, can have no presuppositions, her province is to recall and not to construct ... and she demands from the historian to make his mind simply the mirror of reality, the surrender of his judgment to the decree of the ages, not the projection of his fancies into a region that has forever passed from the limit of creation."  

"This work, the hewing of wood and the drawing of water, has to be done in faith—in the faith that a complete assemblage of the smallest facts of human history will tell in the end. The labour is performed for posterity—for remote posterity."  

"At the very beginning of all conquest of the unknown lies the fact, established and classified to the fullest extent possible at the moment.

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4 Gabriel Monod, "Introduction," Revue historique, 1 (1876), 34.
6 John Caird, as cited, pp. 240–41.
7 J. B. Bury, as cited, p. 31.
To lay such foundations, to furnish such materials for later builders, may be a modest ambition . . . etc."

"Imperfeet as our vision into the future is and must be, by using it as well as we can we shall be enabled better to serve the needs of the historians who shall come after us and enter into our labors. Comforted by this reflection we may retire once more into our subterranean caverns."

This point of view is a well-understood symptom. "And whenever," Paulsen says, "like Faust, [Science] begins to feel that there is something wrong with its critical endeavors or its encheiresis naturae, it straightway consoles itself with general phrases: Nothing is too insignificant for the true scientist; or, We are not yet ready for generalisations; the detail work must first be brought to a close."

The procedure now advocated by historians—namely, that we should investigate the past with our minds a perfect blank as to what we wish to know or what we may expect to find—was formulated by Francis Bacon. "Men," he said, "should bid themselves for a while renounce conceptions, and begin to make acquaintance with things themselves." Bacon himself, however, failed absolutely in attempting to apply his own method, the value of which may be estimated historically by the fact that it has not been followed by any one of the great masters of science.

The actual method of science is based on recognition of the fact that "it is only when we approach Nature with a question that we can expect to get an answer. Only those who seek find. And seeking, as opposed to rummaging, consists of a series of guesses." "Nature gives no reply to a general inquiry—she must be interrogated by questions which already contain the answer she is to give; in other words, the observer can only observe that which he is led by hypothesis to look for: the experimenter can only obtain the result which his experiment is

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10 Friedrich Paulsen, as cited, p. 43.
11 Novum organum, i, 36.
13 W. S. Jevons, as cited, p. 507.
designed to obtain." 15 Of special interest in the present connection is a statement made by Charles Darwin in 1861. "About thirty years ago," he wrote, "there was much talk that geologists ought only to observe and not theorize; and I well remember some one saying that at this rate a man might as well go into a gravel-pit and count the pebbles and describe the colors. How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service!" 16

"I think," Romanes says, "it ought now to be manifest to everyone who studies it, that up to the commencement of the present century the progress of science in general, and of natural history in particular, was seriously retarded by what may be termed the Bugbear of Speculation. Fully awakened to the dangers of web-spinning from the ever-fertile resources of their own inner consciousness, naturalists became more and more abandoned to the idea that their science ought to consist in a mere observation of facts, or tabulation of phenomena, without attempt at theorizing upon their philosophical import. . . . Looking to the enormous results which followed from a deliberate disregard of such traditional canons by Darwin, it has long since become impossible for naturalists, even of the strictest sect, not to perceive that their previous bondage to the law of a mere ritual has been forever superseded by what verily deserves to be regarded as a new dispensation." 17

The insistence of historical scholars on restricting their efforts to the collection of facts appears to be an expression of the desire for certainty in the results obtained. 18 Bacon also entertained this notion. "Our method of discovering the sciences." he said, "is one which leaves not much to acumen and strength of

16 Charles Darwin, More Letters, ed. by Francis Darwin (New York, 1903), I, 195. Darwin's attitude is well expressed in his Autobiography, where, discussing his own mental qualities, he says: "I have steadily endeavored to keep my mind free so as to give up any hypothesis, however much beloved (and I cannot resist forming one on every subject), as soon as facts are shown to be opposed to it." Life and Letters (New York, 1889), I, 83.
18 "La critique historique et les sciences auxiliaires qui s'y rattachent offrent ceci de satisfaisant à ceux qui s'y livrent qu'elles peuvent ... arriver à des résultats positifs et certains." Gabriel Monod, in De la méthode dans les sciences (2e ed., Paris, 1910), p. 388.
wit, but nearly levels all wits and intellects." Science, on the other hand, is adventurous and accepts risk. The scientist recognizes an element of uncertainty in his undertakings, and is well aware that he will be fortunate indeed if his results serve as stepping-stones for the advancement of knowledge. "Certainty is mediate, and the specific characteristic of scientific hypothesis is just that it emphasises this mediacy by bringing it clearly into consciousness." The hypothesis accepted by the scientific investigator is that which seems most in keeping with the facts in his possession at the moment, and the test of its validity is the extent to which it reduces phenomena to order and system. A new hypothesis is admitted when it is found to accord more closely with observed facts or when it brings a greater body of facts into relation with each other than had been done by a previous hypothesis. As the sciences have developed," William James says, "the notion has gained ground that most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations." "Investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of them may from some point of view be useful. Their great use is to summarize old facts and to lead to new ones." Obviously, then, it is not the function of science to gratify the desire of men for certainty. No scientific "law" is to be regarded otherwise than as a "working hypothesis" which has proved of value in organizing some phase of experience. "The conception," Bertrand Russell says, "of the 'working hypothesis,' provisional, approximate, and merely useful, has more and more pushed aside the comfortable eighteenth century conception of 'laws of nature.'"
"For logical purposes a Law of Nature is a compendious formula which is intended to describe the actual behaviour of some selected series of events, and is not known to be merely a convenient fiction."  

"'Law' is a term which is applied to a sequence or a grouping of phenomena only in a metaphorical sense. It is a convenient term which men of science use in classifying their observations, often as a synonym for hypothesis."  

"How idle is it to speak of the law of gravitation, or indeed of any scientific law, as ruling nature. Such laws simply describe, they never explain the routine of our perceptions, the sense-impressions we project into an 'outside world.' "

The method of science is, then, something other than the cataloguing of facts. "Cognitions of particular facts, however accurately observed, do not constitute a science so long as they remain loose and unconnected."  

"A mere after-one-another in time is of no philosophical or scientific interest; thus, e.g., the scientific historian will not write mere annals. Annals are the materials for history, and are not yet history."  

"The task of historical science is just as little exhausted ..., with the fixing of former events as, for instance, the task of physics with the establishment of a single fact, as the temperature of a given place at a given time."  

The facts of history, like those of our personal experience, are particulars, they constitute a sequence of different happenings. Now, "while the apprehension of phenomenal difference ... is the basis or prerequisite of thought, thought proper, i.e., discursive thought, begins with the apprehension of identity amid phenomenal difference. Objects are perceived as different; they are conceived as identical by an attention of the mind to their point or points of agreement. They are thus classified, the points of agreement, i.e., those properties

29 Wilhelm Ostwald, "On the Theory of Science," Congress of Arts and Science, St. Louis, 1904 (Boston, 1905), I, 351.
of the objects of cognition which belong to them in common; serving as the basis of classification.\(^{30}\)

For purposes of thought and communication the particularity of experience is reduced by giving names to classes of objects. Science is the systematic extension of this process beyond the limits of what is immediately obvious. Its fundamental postulate is a formulation of the assumption on which men have always acted in "naming" things—which is, that the phenomena of nature, notwithstanding their infinite variety, may be grouped in classes. While "naming" classifies like objects together, it does not necessarily indicate relations between the classes. Thus, in ordinary language, we speak of "cat," "tiger," "leopard," without verbal suggestion of connection. Science, on the other hand, creates a name-system in which relationship is shown, as, for example, *felis domestica*, *felis tigris*, *felis pardus*. Furthermore, in addition to nouns there are verbs; actions and processes are named as well as objects. Here again Science assumes a regularity in nature that makes "naming" possible, and one of its great objects is to disengage processes from the complex of phenomena and describe them in convenient formulae. Science may thus be said to reverse the operation involved in the compilation of a dictionary, for while the latter undertaking begins with "names," Science arrives at names—like "natural selection," and "conservation of energy"—when its formulae come to be generally accepted.

Any individual fact is the focal point of an indeterminate number of natural processes. The perplexing thing in nature, and, one might say, the very reason for the existence of Science, is that processes do not exhibit themselves in isolation—such as is artificially set up in laboratory experiments—but are hidden in intricate combinations. Appearances vary owing to the interference of processes with each other; if there were no "complications" in medical cases it would be possible to state precisely the course of any malady; antiseptics are used to prevent the

\(^{30}\) Stallo, as cited, p. 130.
intrusion of undesirable "natural" processes. In face of this situation scientific investigators have found that knowledge is to be obtained, not by massing facts indiscriminately together, but by following up one specific inquiry at a time. Science proceeds by breaking up the totality of the universe into parts, and by experiment and observation isolates phenomena from their surroundings. Science "is before all a classification, a manner of bringing together facts which appearances separate."31 "In mentally separating a body from the changeable environment in which it moves, what we really do is to extricate a group of sensations on which our thoughts are fastened and which is of relatively greater stability than the others, from the stream of all our sensations."32 In thus isolating or dissecting strands it must be understood that science does not exhaust experience, nor does any given investigation assume to exhaust the content of the phenomena with which it deals. "Physical science," Mach says, "does not pretend to be a complete view of the world; it simply claims that it is working toward such a complete view in the future. The highest philosophy of the scientific investigator is precisely this toleration of an incomplete conception of the world and the preference for it rather than an apparently perfect, but inadequate conception."33 It follows that there will always be elements in the phenomena which, from the point of view of the particular investigation, are irrelevant—in other words, "accidental." While, however, science recognizes this characteristic in phenomena, it assumes that the "accidental" aspect springs from the limited scope of the inquiry which is being pursued. "Accident" is thus seen to be natural process out of focus for an individual investigator at a given time.

Science, then, sorts phenomena in order to identify processes. In doing this there is but one possible method it can employ, and

"hypotheses must guide all attempts to attain knowledge." The result being given, and the problem being to discover how this result has been arrived at, science is forced to adopt the method of trial-solution. "In selecting a working hypothesis," Lodge says, "we must proceed by trial and error." "To try several clues, and at last to perceive the probabilities in favor of one of them, to pursue that one into all its consequences and ramifications till it is either verified or discredited—that is scientific procedure." The method pursued is to suppose such a process as would seem to account for the results given in experience, and to test this supposition or hypothesis by reference to the facts.

"Modern discoveries have not been made by large collections of facts, with subsequent discussion, separation, and resulting deduction of a truth thus rendered perceptible. A few facts have suggested an hypothesis, which means a supposition, proper to explain them. The necessary results of this supposition are worked out, and then, and not till then, other facts are examined to see if these ulterior results are found in nature." "Everyone," Venn remarks, "who has ever had to work out the solution of any little matter in daily life which has puzzled him, knows how many and how wild were the guesses that flitted through his mind before he paused at one which seemed more hopeful. The larger the stock from which he has to draw, the better, other things being equal, is his chance of finding a good one amongst them. And the same holds good of the more serious speculations of the scientific man."

"All intellectual processes are based on abstraction—that is, on concentrated attention directed to a selected portion, with limitation of scope, and elimination of whatever may be regarded as unessential or irrelevant. ... Anatomists dissect out the nervous system, the blood-vessels, and the muscles, and depict them separately—there must be discrimination for intellectual grasp—but in life they are all merged and co-operating together; they do not really work separately, though they may be studied separately. ... The laws of nature are a diagrammatic framework, analysed or abstracted out of the full comprehensiveness of reality."

Scientific investigators are fully aware that this method involves grave dangers. "With the valuable parts of physical

theories,'" Mach says, "we necessarily absorb a good dose of false metaphysics, which it is very difficult to sift out from what deserves to be preserved, especially when those theories have become very familiar to us." Hence it is that Science requires, for its protection no less than for its guaranty, the labor of verification. "The progress of physical science since the revival of learning," Huxley stated, "is largely due to the fact that men have gradually learned to lay aside the consideration of unverifiable hypotheses; to guide observation and experiment by verifiable hypotheses; and to consider the latter, not as ideal truths, the real entities of an intelligible world behind phenomena, but as a symbolical language, by the aid of which Nature can be interpreted in terms apprehensible by our intellects." Verification, Lewes pointed out, "was so little understood by the ancients, that it found neither employment in their practice, nor recognition in their philosophy." "To this source every one of their errors may be traced. Every error may be shown to have arisen from reliance upon unproved facts, precipitate inductions, or mere phrases reasoned from as if they were demonstrated truths. And to this source, likewise, may all the errors of moderns be traced." 

Science, then, is aggressive, and aims at overcoming the particularity that distinguishes the universe. To this end it attacks the world piecemeal, and dissect and isolates strand after strand from the totality of things, on the assumption that the whole is like a cable—but what the cable is for, how it comes to be made up of fibres and strands, and between what points it stretches, are questions that Science regards as outside its province and beyond its ken.

38 Ernst Mach, Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations, tr. by C. M. Williams (Chicago, 1897), p. 23, note.
III
HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

1

The word history is commonly used in a variety of senses; thus in speaking of the "history" of a state we may mean either a narrative or the course of events in the past, just as in speaking of a man's "life" we may refer either to his biography or to the sequence of his personal experiences. In the former of these senses, which the usage of scholars sets in the foreground, the word retains the double meaning attached to it by the Greeks, and implies both investigation and composition.

"We are apt," Gilbert Murray says, "to apply to the sixth century the terminology of the fourth, and to distinguish philosophy from history. But when Solon the philosopher 'went over much land in search of knowledge,' he was doing exactly the same thing as the historians Herodotus and Hecataeus. ... 'Historia' is inquiry, and 'Philosophia' is love of knowledge. The two cover to a great extent the same field ... [but] the 'Historikos' is mostly a traveller and reciter of stories."1

The critical spirit of the Ionian awakened to the realization that, as Hecataeus said, the stories of the Greeks were diverse and incredible, and proceeded forthwith to revise the narratives that formerly had been unquestioningly accepted. Though new, historical investigation did not supplant composition, for it was regarded as ancillary to historiography. Throughout the classical period the older element retained its primacy, and, owing to the cultivation of rhetoric, which was taught, even tended to exercise an undue influence on research, which was not taught. In the

1 History of Ancient Greek Literature (New York, 1897), p. 123. Cf. Alfred & Maurice Croiset, Histoire de la littérature grecque (Paris, 1890), II, 535; J. B. Bury, The Ancient Greek Historians (New York, 1909), p. 16. The double significance may perhaps be felt in Burke's phrase "to rake into the histories of former ages ...," since the word "rake" is here the modern representative of the Old English racu or raca, history. The German word Geschichte involves a reference to that which has come to pass, das Geschehene, and has therefore primarily the objective signification. Cf. P. E. Geiger, Das Wort "Geschichte" und seine Zusammensetzungen (Freiburg, i.B., 1908.).
nineteenth century the situation is different, for scholarship, reverting, one might say, to the primary meaning of the word history, makes a sharp distinction between historical investigation, which, it asserts, is a science, and historical composition, which it regards as an art. Today, among scholars, "history" is identified in a special manner with the new element of inquiry that distinguished the work of Hecataeus from the compositions of the epic poets; and it is stated with authority that "to clothe the story of a human society in a literary dress is no more the part of a historian as a historian [meaning investigator], than it is the part of an astronomer to present in artistic shape the story of the stars." Indeed, the separation has become so pronounced that it has been found necessary to reclaim for the word history its classical dualism of meaning. "Is history a science or an art?" "Men," Firth says, "give opposite answers according to their conception of the methods and objects of the historian." "To me," he continues, "truth seems to lie between these two extremes. History is neither, but partakes of the nature of both. A two-fold task lies before the historian. One half of his business is the discovery of the truth, and the other half its representation." So, by way of a twentieth-century compromise, the position of Hecataeus is regained.

The view expressed by Firth is widely held; thus Albert Sorel says: "L'histoire tend à devenir une science, la science des sociétés; elle a toujours été, elle sera toujours un art, l'art de démêler les passions des hommes et de les peindre." "L'histoire est un art," Camille Jullian thinks, "à la condition d'être d'abord une science." Gabriël Monod is of opinion "que l'investigation et la construction historiques constituent une science qui fournit ses matériaux à l'art de l'histoire. En un mot, c'est dans la méthode et la critique historiques et dans les résultats de leurs opérations que consiste la science de l'histoire. Tout ce qui est mise en œuvre, exposition, est l'art de l'histoire.

4 Nouveaux essais d'histoire et de critique (Paris, 1898), p. 11.
“On a longtemps discuté,” it has been said, “la question de savoir si l’histoire est une science ou un art. La question est vraiment oiseuse, l’histoire est à la fois une science et un art.” “L’histoire n’est donc pas une curiosité, un dilettantisme sans portée, c’est une science rigoureuse, c’est un art exquis, c’est l’inépuisable répertoire de l’expérience acquise par l’humanité, depuis qu’elle a commencé de se connaître.”

“In this vexed question whether history is an art or a science, let us call it both or call it neither. For it has an element of both. It is not in guessing at historical ‘cause and effect’ that science comes in; but in collecting and weighing evidence as to facts, something of the scientific spirit is required for an historian, just as it is for a detective or a politician.”

“I am therefore unable to agree with those who think that history must be either exclusively a science or an art. It is a science to the extent to which what are commonly known as scientific methods are requisite for accuracy and proper proportion in the details used in the presentation. But the presentation must always be largely that of an artist in whose mind it is endowed with form and life.”

To the earlier Greeks, the writer of prose narrative was a logographer, and the historian an investigator. Unfortunately, the disuse of the former term has led to much confusion of thought. This may be observed in the character of the suggestions that have been put forward for a beginning-point of “history.” Thus, while admitting that “long before history, in the proper sense of the word, came to be written, the early Greeks possessed a literature which was equivalent to history for them and was accepted with unreserved credence—their epic poems,” Bury is of opinion that the Greeks originated history because they were the first to apply criticism to historical materials. If, however, the specialist of a later period be consulted, he will be found to say, with Lord Acton, that “in the Renaissance, the art of exposing falsehood dawned upon keen Italian minds, [and] it was then that history as we understand it began to be understood, and the illustrious dynasty of scholars arose to whom we still look both for method and material.”

So, likewise, the student of modern history would have "history" begin in his period. "The Middle Ages," Gooch says, "produced historical writers of high literary merit—Matthew Paris and Lambert of Herzelf, Joinville and Froissart— whose testimony to events of their own time was fairly trustworthy; but the essential conditions of study did not exist." "For the liberty of thought and expression, the insight into different ages and the judicial temper on which historical science depends, the world had to wait till the nineteenth century, the age of the Second Renaissance."

"L'histoire, qu'on la considère comme une branche de la littérature ou comme une science, date pour nous de la Renaissance. Sans doute le moyen-âge avait eu parmi ses chroniqueurs des écrivains remarquables tels que Joinville, Villani ou Froissart, mais ils ne sont pas à proprement parler des historiens; ils ont en vue plutôt le présent que le passé; ils veulent conserver pour la postérité le souvenir des événements qu'ils ont vus et auxquels ils ont pris part, plutôt que retracer à leurs contemporains une image fidèle des temps antérieurs."  

The series of illustrations might, of course, be carried much further; thus Round says of Freeman: "But then I should hasten to add that he belonged to a by-gone school, that he had not the modern scientifique spirit or the modern ardour for discovery—that, in a word, ... he was 'a superseded fossil.' "

Arbois de Jubainville has devoted a book to an exposure of the faults of Fustel de Coulanges. The fundamental idea of Fustel, he says, is false; it was not religion that was "l'unique base de la société primitive"—but war! "Les œuvres historiques écrites a priori sous l'empire de ce préjugé antimitaire ont été le fléau de notre pays."  

"The tone of contemptuous superiority is never absent"—this remark, singularly enough, was not made with any reference to modern historians; Bernadotte Perrin thus describes the characteristic attitude of classical historians towards their predecessors.  

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16 Cf. his address "The Ethics and Amenities of Greek Historiography," American Journal of Philology, 18 (1897), 255-274.
Thus "history" is made to begin anew with every reawakening of the critical spirit. Obviously, these discoveries of "beginnings" are made by scholars who identify history with critical inquiry. On the other hand, those who identify it primarily with composition press the beginning ever further back, not only to epic poems and ballads, but to the simplest recital of some unwonted occurrence or adventure.

It is true that the historical scholars of the nineteenth century undertook the reform of historical method with high ideals of objectivity and truthfulness. Having made the discovery that there existed materials—like the Venetian Relazioni—for testing the accuracy of the older narratives in the discarded relics and forgotten mementoes preserved in the lumber-rooms and waste-heaps of civilization, scholars devoted themselves to the work of criticism and revision. And, indeed, just as old personal letters re-read will revivify circumstances which have faded with time, and correct the impressions retained of even memorable happenings, so the community memory has been reawakened and restored by the exploitation of archives, the excavation of ruins, and the elucidation of customs and observances by comparative study. The result of the discovery of verificatory materials was that scholars proceeded—like Hecataeus—to call in question the reliability of the great series of writings which embody the memory of European peoples in regard to their past. At the same time, however, the new results continue to be stated in the old form.

History, as Gaston Boissier remarks, "has perfected its methods, it has not changed it nature." The Greeks consciously regarded composition as the aim of the historian, and required that the statements incorporated should be subjected to criticism.


18 That the standards of criticism have varied with the ages goes without saying. On the other hand, to judge ancient criticism by modern
In the last analysis, the academic practice of the present has not modified this formula, even though it ignores composition and throws the weight of its approval on the side of investigation. In fact, it has not been questioned that historiography—the presentation of events in narrative form—is the end towards which all inquiry is contributory. This is implied, for example, in the common acceptance of Ranke as a pattern of the modern historian. His formula—‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’—which, in the discussions of the last half-century, has come to have a significance out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance, has in its own context no greater significance than any one of the many similar statements that had been made and remade since the Renaissance. Ranke was a man of letters, and he restated the contents of Venetian dispatches with all the assurance of a Livy or a Dio Cassius. He himself avoided any probing of the fundamental problems of historical study; for him, as for his

standards is the abnegation of historical thinking. Compare, for example, such statements as that of Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: ‘The many words which Polybius devotes to his own method and to the criticism of Ephorus and Timaeus are at bottom as banal as Lucian’s essay on the writing of history.’ Greek Historical Writing, tr. by Gilbert Murray (Oxford, 1908), p. 15. Mommsen had earlier said of Polybius: ‘His treatment of all questions, in which right, honour, religion are involved, is not merely shallow, but radically false.’ History of Rome, tr. by W. P. Dickson, IV, 246.


20 Compare, for example, the following extract from Edmund Bolton’s Hypercritica (1618): ‘For all late Authors that ever yet I could read among us convey with them, to Narrations of things done fifteen or sixteen hundred years past, the Jealousies, Passions, and Affections of their own Time. Our Historians must therefore avoid this dangerous Syren, alluring us to follow our own Prejudices, unless he mean only to serve a Side and not to serve Truth and Honesty, and so to remain but in price while his Party is able to bear him out with all his Faults, for quarrels sake. He is simply therefore to set forth, without Prejudices, Depravations, or sinister items, things as they are.’ In J. E. Spingarn, Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1908), I, 93.

predecessors, "history" meant a narrative based upon what seemed the best testimony available—and even Professor Bury presents his scientific results in narrative form. "I know of no one," Mr. Round says, "who wishes to confuse the writing of synthetic history with the work of original research; still less does any one demand that the former shall be given up and the latter alone permitted." We, he continues; who are engaged in the work of research 'are but paving the way for the 'synthetic' historian' of popular desire.\textsuperscript{22}

It is one of the great obstacles to the promotion of a mutual understanding between historical scholars that in any discussion of the problems of historical study the minds of the participants play fast and loose with the different meanings of the word \textit{history} itself. In the first instance, as has been seen, the word meant "inquiry;" but, whether in the classical period, the Renaissance, or today, in the common usage of men it has meant and still means the finished literary product to which the results of all our investigative technique are merely tributary. It is another matter that many scholars at the present time carry on their researches without heed of any relation between inquiry and historiography, and are far from being satisfied with a conception that limits historical work to this position of subordination. These scholars aim, as they say, to pursue "history," meaning investigation, "for its own sake," and find satisfaction in the thought that their work is scientific. It is, in fact, to these scholars, who may or may not be conscious of "le malaise dont souffre l'histoire," of which Louis Halphen speaks, that the present considerations touching the underlying problems of historical method are primarily addressed; but to these men, in particular, it is necessary to say that "history" is the name of a literary form or genre having pronounced individual characteristics, and that these characteristics must be observed and

\textsuperscript{22} J. H. Round, "Historical Research," \textit{Nineteenth Century}, 44 (1898), 1005. The attitude of certain modern investigators seems to be quite perfectly expressed by Mr. Round in the same context. "But all we ask," he says, "is that Mr. Harrison should allow us to pursue our toilsome path, and refrain from ridiculing our method and caricaturing our results."
described before it is possible to discuss intelligently the possibilities that await historical investigation conducted upon an independent footing.

2

At any moment, it might be considered, there are as many things happening as there are human beings. In the broadest sense these happenings are the facts of history. On the other hand, everyone will agree that a few only of all these incidents are of "historical" importance. Even the most detailed of diaries or of letters to absent friends omits the common affairs of daily life. So, in regard to public affairs, there is a continual process of selection going on, by which "important" events are singled out and retained in memory. There is, too, an ascending scale of importance in events—the destruction of a city is felt to be less memorable than the downfall of an empire. In a sense, moreover, happenings are not memorable intrinsically, but in proportion to the scope of their consequences; whether the assassination of a dignitary or official will be passed over with a momentary expression of condemnation or will shake civilization to its foundations depends upon what may be described as the strategic position which he occupies at the juncture. History narrates the specific acts of individuals, but always in relation to wider issues; the individual with whose acts it is concerned stands, if but for a moment, in a definite relation to the life and honor of the group of which he is a part. Briefly, the facts with which history is concerned are happenings that are unusual; they are events which for one reason or another compel the attention of men. Consequently, it is inevitable that histories should chronicle wars, and ignore the routine life of peoples.

Furthermore, it is evident that the events chronicled are those that appear unusual to men at the time. Take the following extracts from the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle:

A.D. 793. This year came dreadful fore-warnings over the land of the Northumbrians, terrifying the people most woefully: these were immense sheets of light rushing through the air, and whirlwinds, and fiery dragons
flying across the firmament. These tremendous tokens were soon followed by a great famine; ... A.D. 890. ... This year also was Plegmund chosen by God and all his saints to the archbishopric in Canterbury.

A.D. 891. This year ... after Easter, about the gang-days, or before, appeared the star that men in book-Latin call cometa: some say that in English it may be termed "hairy star"; for that there standeth off from it a long gleam of light, whilom on one side, whilom on each.

Similarly, every age has its own criteria for distinguishing between the usual and unusual, between events "historically" negligible and events "historically" important. A problem thus presents itself to the investigator, for, while his purpose is to determine what it was that happened, he is limited in making his statements of fact to what has already been recorded, and this, in turn, is a selection made by men whose ideas and judgments are different from his own. Now, one may say that "no guide is so sure for an historian as an overmastering sense of the importance of events as they appeared to those who took part in them," and that "there can be no other basis on which to found any truly sympathetic treatment," but this does not meet the point that the bases of judgment in regard to what is unusual, exceptional, or important vary with time. In other words, neither the contemporary chronicler nor the later historian determines what is noteworthy in events by a fixed standard; the one like the other follows unconsciously the association of his own ideas. Far indeed from accepting just what he finds substantiated in his authorities, the modern historian takes it as a postulate that "no man, not even the greatest and wisest, can fully understand the significance of what he is doing," and believes that it is because we are not contemporaries of the events that we can describe intelligently what it was that actually took place. Briefly, this means that the shifting interests of the ever-changing present constitute the criteria of importance for the irrevocable happenings of the past. That this subjective view is regarded with approval is evident from the frequent reiteration

of Goethe's saying that "History must from time to time be rewritten, not because many new facts have been discovered, but because new aspects come into view, because the participant in the progress of an age is led to standpoints from which the past can be regarded and judged in a novel manner." "It is not," Mark Pattison stated, "because new facts are continually accumulating, because criticism is growing more rigid, or even because style varies; but because ideas change, the whole mode and manner of looking at things alters with every age; and so every generation requires facts to be recast in its own mould, demands that the history of its forefathers be rewritten from its own point of view." 24

The historian's aim is the statement of what has taken place in the past. In a stricter view this is a restatement, made after examination of the available evidence, of what men have said took place. The modern historian, however, does not accept the judgment of the contemporary reporter as to what is historically important; on the contrary, he sets aside Plegmund and the comet to piece together inadvertent hints with the object of reconstructing aspects of life which, as usual and familiar to contemporaries, escaped direct mention in their writings. The original statement is a selection from the infinite number of contemporary happenings made in accordance with ideas current at the time; the modern restatement is a selection, dominated by ideas current now, from the restricted content of the original statements. It follows, therefore, that the basis of selection for the facts of history is subjective; and that the judgments of any present time in regard to the past remain, for still later inquiries, documents

24 "Gregory of Tours" [1845], in his Essays (Oxford, 1889), I, 2. Cf. F. H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical History (Oxford, 1874), p. 15. "The history then, which is for us, is matter of inference, and in the last resort has existence, as history, as a record of events, by means of an inference of our own. And this inference furthermore can never start from a background of nothing; it is never a fragmentary isolated act of our mind, but is essentially connected with, and in entire dependence on the character of our general consciousness. And so the past varies with the present, and can never do otherwise, since it is always the present upon which it rests. This present is presupposed by it, and is its necessary preconception."
in the history of ideas rather than contributions to knowledge of the past.

"Most of the great historians whom our age has produced will, centuries hence, probably be more interesting as exhibiting special methods of research, special views on political, social, and literary progress, than as faithful and reliable chroniclers of events; and the objectivity on which some of them pride themselves will be looked upon not as freedom from but as unconsciousness on their part of the preconceived notions which have governed them." 25

"L'historien est dominé à son insu par les idées religieuses, philosophiques, politiques qui circulent autour de lui, et il serait facile de montrer par exemple que l’Histoire universelle de Bossuet, le Siècle de Louis XIV de Voltaire, les œuvres de Guizot, d’Augustin Thierry, de Macaulay, de Droysen ou de Ranke, ne sont que des produits spécifiques de certains états de civilisation ou de culture nationale. Bref, on peut dater une conception historique comme on date, en histoire de l’art, les écoles et les styles. 26

Again, an imaginative element is introduced into historical narrative by the mode in which the historian deals with the materials he accepts. If the conventions of historical investigation, instead of permitting the selection of such facts from the sources as are interesting to us, were to require that everything contained in the documents should be considered, the investigator would be forced to question how the facts we ignore came to be regarded as important by contemporaries. At any time, the conception of what is remarkable or worthy of record is a function of the whole body of current ideas, and what the writer sets down represents not merely his private judgment, but that of the community of which he forms a part. Hence we are led to see the force of Maitland’s dictum that history is not only "what men have said and done," but "above all what they have thought." From such a beginning important lines of investigation would open out: thus we would have to inquire how ideas arise, and what is the relation between ideas and conduct; and this would form an introduction to the strictly historical task of tracing the actual emergence of ideas in the past, and the consequent modifications of conduct that ensued. As it is the

26 Henri Pirenne, Revue historique, 64 (1897), 52.
business of psychology to determine, by present observation and experiment, "the processes whereby an individual becomes aware of a world of objects and adjusts his actions accordingly," so history would inquire into the results of the same processes throughout the course of time. It may be remarked that for such an inquiry every statement preserved from an earlier period would have an objective value.

The modern historian has, however, adopted another approach to psychology, concentrating his attention upon the problem of the relation in which the writer stood to the events he described, with the object of detecting the bias in his statement of what took place. The result of this has been the incorporation into history of naïve speculations as to personal motives. This procedure is natural, for it is followed by everyone in daily life. Habitually we interpret the behavior of others by analogy, attributing to them motives such as we recognize in ourselves; and not only do historians introduce similar psychological speculations to account for the views of earlier writers and the actions of historical characters, but they regard this exercise of the imagination as the final proof of competent scholarship.

Of Ranke, Fueter says: "... an sich hat er sicherlich sein Bedeutendstes als historischer Psychologue geleistet. ... suchte Ranke bis zum Innern der Persönlichkeit vorzudringen. ... So liebevolle Sorgfalt hatte bisher noch nie jemand der historischen Psychologie zugewandt. Am wenigsten die Historiker selbst. ... Er ruhte nicht, bis er das Seelenleben historischer Persönlichkeiten bis in seine feinsten Verzweigungen blossgelegt hatte. Er besass in wunderbarem Masse die Fähigkeit, in die Empfindungen fremder Menschen einzudringen und ihre Gedanken nachzufühlen, zu penetriren, wie er es nannte."

29 In order to determine which statements are to be suspected, we are to ask what can have been the general aim of the author in writing the document as a whole; and again, what can have been his particular purpose in making each of the separate statements which compose the document." C. V. Langlois & C. Seignobos, Introduction to the Study of History, tr. by G. G. Berry (New York, 1903), p. 166.
20 Fueter, as cited, pp. 477-78.
Of Stubbs, it was said by an intimate: "His historic instinct was such as to enable him not only to judge of men and of the course of events, but made him capable of predicting with remarkable precision how a man would act in certain circumstances."30

Stubbs himself wrote: "It is almost a matter of necessity for the student of history to work out for himself some definite idea of the characters of the great men of the period he is employed upon. History cannot be well read as a chess problem, and the man who tries to read it so is not worthy to read it at all. Its scenes cannot be realized, its lessons cannot be learned, if the actors are looked on merely as puppets."31

"The historian," Henry Nettleship said, "is not only a lover of truth, not only a chronicler of events. These, indeed, he must be at his peril, but how much more! Insight into human nature—and this implies the rarest knowledge and finest sympathy of which man is capable; the power of tracing the delicate relation between deed and motive, and the pressure of action upon circumstance and circumstance upon action; knowledge of the world, in short, in the highest sense of that expression."32

Lord Acton thought that "the science of character comes in with modern history."33

Elsewhere he says: "The responsible writer's character, his position, antecedents, and probable motives have to be examined into; and this is what, in a different and adapted sense of the word, may be called the higher criticism, in comparison with the servile and often mechanical work of pursuing statements to their root."34

Professor Firth is of opinion that a contemporary "who undertook to write a history of the seventeenth century could put together a pretty full account of what happened, but it must be necessarily rather superficial and general. He could not go below the surface and explain either the causes of events or the motives of the actors."35

"Captain Vidal," an Oxford professor says, "has not only worked out the complex mind of Soul . . . nor the moods of his generals alone, but that of the army, the magistrates, and the civil population of southern France."36

After all this it is refreshing to come upon D. G. Hogarth's apologia: "The charm of guessing ancient motives from the records of ancient

36 C. Oman, English Historical Review, 29 (1914), 590.
deeds fascinated me—there is much in the pursuit to appeal to a gambler—and I resolved to attempt a speculative biography of some great man.'"37

Well, we are moderns, but Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote of Theopompus: "There remains his crowning and most characteristic quality, . . . the gift of seeing and stating in each case not only what is obvious to the multitude, but of examining even the hidden motives of actions and actors and the feelings of the soul (things not easily discerned by the crowd), and of laying bare all the mysteries of seeming virtue and undiscovered vice. Indeed, I can well believe that the fabled examination, before the judges in the other world, of souls in Hades when separated from the body is of the same searching kind as that which is conducted by means of the writings of Theopompus."38

Notwithstanding the fact that we conduct our lives in relation to those around us on inferences as to their feelings and desires, it is evident that no one can observe directly what is going on in the mind of another. The inferential process has a certain practical justification in its application to those among whom we have been brought up, and with whom we are in familiar association. On the other hand, "the besetting snare of the psychologist is the tendency to assume that an act or attitude which in himself would be the natural manifestation of a certain mental process must, therefore, have the same meaning in the case of another."39 Even with our own contemporaries we are continually making mistakes, and "interpretation becomes more difficult in proportion to the difference between the mind of the psychologist and the mind which he is investigating."40 Hence, in considering the mental condition of persons "widely removed in their general circumstances and conditions from our own, we must assume an attitude of critical suspense until we have taken into account everything which can have a bearing on the problem."41 Nevertheless, the historian boldly projects himself into the past, and endeavors to make the actions of Alexanders and Attilas psychologically intelligible to modern readers by imagining himself in their place. In so doing he subordinates the facts

39 G. F. Stout, as cited, p. 22.
40 Stout, as cited, p. 21.
41 Stout, as cited, p. 23.
to his own personality, and heightens the interest of the narrative by giving it the color of comprehensibility.

The ascription of motives is a dubious venture for one who professes to limit his statements to known and documented facts, but not only is the practice questionable in itself, it leads on to an attitude still less in keeping with the claims of historical research. In fact, inferences in regard to the motives of others are almost necessarily followed by judgments upon their conduct. So Lord Acton can say: "I exhort you never to debase the moral currency or to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try others by the final maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on wrong." It may be well to point out that the masters of ethical theory are the first to utter warnings against the formulation of judgments such as these. "Histories," T. H. Green says, "no doubt, would be much shortened, and would be found much duller, if speculations about the motives (as distinct from the intentions) of the chief historical agents were omitted; nor shall we soon cease to criticise the actions of contemporaries on the strength of inferences from act to motive. But in all this we are on very uncertain ground. . . . It is wiser not to make guesses where we can do no more than guess, and to confine ourselves . . . to measuring the value of actions by their effects without reference to the character of the agents."

42 "The practice of introducing imaginary speeches into histories being now generally abandoned, the modern historian cannot be accused of this aberration from truth. But, in general, he indemnifies himself amply for this forbearance. If he does not put imaginary words into the mouths of his speakers, he suggests imaginary motives for their acts."


43 A Lecture on the Study of History (London, 1896), p. 63. Cf. R. G. Latham's description of the historian's work, Man and His Migrations (New York, 1852), pp. 9–10: "An empire is consolidated, a contest concluded, a principle asserted, and the civil historian records them. He does more. If he be true to his calling, he investigates the springs of action in individual actors, measures the calibre of their moral and intellectual power, and pronounces a verdict of praise or blame upon the motives which determine their manifestation."

The historian, then, "selects" the facts to be included in his work in accordance with some personal localized view; and "explains" events by the imaginative reconstruction of the character and motives of the participants. The "selection" of facts and the "realisation of character" are thus seen to be fundamental elements of historiography; but to appreciate fully the significance of this fact a wider outlook must be taken.  

Every art involves the two elements of expression and form. The object of the artist is not to communicate information, but to stimulate in others a mood or feeling similar to his own. The work of art is not a direct or immediate reaction to experience (such as is the cry of physical pain) or a mere statement of fact; the impulse in which it originates is the emotion evoked by the memory of an experience. This act of creation which is characteristic of art has its beginning when the experience is lived over in the mind of the artist and is remade by contemplation. "On the actual day of battle naked truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms." The work of art is not a transcript of experience, but the experience seen through the impression it has produced; it is not the utterance of personal hope or fear, but the expression of such an emotion detached from its immediate relation to the artist. The aim of the artist is not the imitation of a fife and drum, but the reproduction of what is felt to have been the mood or emotion evoked by hearing the fife and drum in certain circumstances. The effect produced may be illustrated by a description from Priscus:  

"When evening came on torches were lighted and two barbarians stepped forth in front of Attila and recited poems which they had composed, recounting his victories and his valiant deeds in war. The banqueters fixed their eyes upon them, some being charmed with the poems, while others were roused in spirit, as the recollection of their wars came  

back to them. Others again burst into tears, because their bodies were enfeebled by age and their martial ardour had perchance to remain unsatisfied." 46

Form is limitation imposed by the necessity of concentration and relevance if the impression is to be adequately conveyed. Since emotion is dissipated by diffuseness, and attention distracted by the suggestion of alternative avenues of thought, "unity" is the first requisite of a work of art. Artistic creation is the vivid realization or apprehension of an "action." The question of the artist's "selection" of facts for presentation, as of his choice of subject and the proportion and symmetry in his treatment, arise only when the work of art comes to be the subject of academic discussion. The problem of "beauty" is likewise secondary, being concerned with the effect produced by the work of art upon its auditors or beholders. "Beauty" is not the aim of the artist; it is a term used to express the sense of satisfaction in the auditor or beholder at the adequate rendering of the subject. It will thus be seen that all art is, in a sense, "opportunist," that is, dependent upon fortuitous stimulation for inspiration.

Now, historiography, as we have seen, is the relation of unusual happenings; it is the narration of matters that are felt to be momentous in a higher sense, and that arouse passion to a more emphatic type of expression than the vicissitudes of men's private fortunes. On the other hand, the intensity of its expression is matched by a strict limitation in the width of its appeal, for whereas men of all times and countries find in themselves an aesthetic response to the dramas of Sophocles and Shakespeare, histories are written for men of one time and one people. So it is that "historic art," as Hirn says, "has everywhere reached its highest state of development amongst nations who have had to hold their own vi et armis against neighboring tribes, or in the midst of which antagonistic families have fought for supremacy." 47 "Most of the old German heroic poetry," Ker

46 Tr. from Fragmenta Historiorum Graecorum, IV, 92, in H. M. Chadwick, The Heroic Age (Cambridge, 1912), p. 84. The account refers to the year A. D. 448.
remarks, "is clearly to be traced, as far as its subjects are concerned, to the most exciting periods in early German history, between the fourth and sixth centuries." Bernadotte Perrin observes, "it always required some great spectacular struggle—the Trojan War, the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War, the duel between Sparta and Thebes, the Hellenic conquest of Asia—to elicit, as it were, a great historian." 49

One is reminded of Lucian's caustic introduction to his essay on The Way to Write History: "Well, to compare like with like, the majority of our educated class is now suffering from an Abderite epidemic. ... From the beginning of the present excitement—the barbarian war, the Armenian disaster, the succession of victories—you cannot find a man but is writing history; nay, everyone you meet is a Thucydides, a Herodotus, a Xenophon. The old saying must be true, and war be the father of all things, seeing what a litter of historians it has now teemed forth at a birth." 50

Similarly, in the fifteenth century, "it was the early success of the French war which gave the stimulus that was needed to produce the first fruit of a national historical literature" in England, while, not to multiply instances unnecessarily, it is a commonplace of knowledge that European historiography in the nineteenth century was born of war.

Pursuing this phase of the subject, it will be seen further that historiography is the account of struggles seen in the light of their outcome. A concurrent, moment-for-moment record of occurrences, if any such existed, would provide most desirable materials for history, but would not be regarded as historiography. The relation of statement to event is uniquely brought out by Sir Ian Hamilton:

49 "History," in Greek Literature, a Series of Lectures delivered at Columbia University (New York, 1912), p. 152.
"If," he says, "facts are hurriedly issued, fresh from the mint of battle, they cannot be expected to supply an account which is either well-balanced or exhaustive. On the other hand, it is equally certain that, when once the fight has been fairly lost or won, it is the tendeney of all ranks to combine and recast the story of their achievement into a shape which shall satisfy the susceptibilities of national and regimental vainglory. It is then already too late for the painstaking historian to set to work. He may record the orders given and the movements which ensued, and he may build up thereon any ingenious theories which occur to him; but to the hopes and fears which dictated those orders, and to the spirit and method in which those movements were executed, he has forever lost the clue. On the actual day of battle naked truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms."  

It is evident, then, that historiography, however near the event, is not a colorless record, but is a rendering of what has happened in terms of the emotions awakened by the result. Here the case of Thucydides suggests itself. On the basis of his statement that "he began to write when they first took up arms," modern opinion appears to assume, despite the evidence, that the history as we have it was composed concurrently with the events. So it is asserted, for example, that "he did not take up his pen to celebrate, his aim was to understand."  

What the hopes and intentions of Thucydides at the beginning of the war may have been we do not know; it was the result—or shall we say the peripeteia, the tragic "revolution," the climax of pity and terror, the decisive reversal?—which determined that the Athenian version of the history of the Peloponnesian War should be an Athenian tragedy. "The catastrophe of 404 B.C. set in a new light the significance of all that had happened since the original outbreak of hostilities in 431 B.C., and imparted to the whole series of events a unity of meaning."  

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52 A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book during the Russo-Japanese War (5th impr., London, 1907), I, v.  
55 Bury, as cited, p. 80.
porated in the results of scholarship, and this is the spirit manifested in the community of which the writer is a part. The description of the conflict may be imperfect or inaccurate, but it reflects the emotion of those whose fortunes turned upon the issue. Men of genius, it has been said, 'are in general distinguished by their extreme susceptibility to external experience; the great historians are men of genius who have felt and rendered adequately the emotions of their fellows in the crises of national existence. So it is true that "contemporary history never dies," that "Thucydides and Clarendon are immortal," and that "on the other hand, no reputation is so fleeting as that of the 'standard' historian of his day." 56

The spirit in which history is written can best be appreciated from a study of origins. Heroic poetry begins in descriptions of contemporary happenings. A perfect example of this type of narrative is the Old English poem on the battle of Maldon. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle records the incident to which the poem relates (991 A.D.): "This year was Ipswich plundered; and very soon afterwards was Alderman Britnoth slain at Maldon." The poem is epic in quality and its tone may be caught from Professor Ker's translation of a notable passage:

"Byrhtwold spoke and grasped his shield—he was an old companion—he shook his ashen spear, and taught courage to them that fought:—

"Thought shall be the harder, heart the keener, mood shall be the more, as our might lessens. Here our prince lies low, they have hewn him to death! Grief and sorrow forever on the man that leaves this war-play! I am old of years, but hence I will not go; I think to lay me down by the side of my lord, by the side of the man I cherished." 57

The speech is the poet's but it embodies the spirit of the time and glories in the heroic deed even though it ended in disaster, and prizes the virtues of loyalty to the chieftain and unflinching courage in the face of defeat. 58 "Heroic poetry—

56 Mark Pattison, Essays (Oxford, 1889), I, 1.
57 Ker, as cited, p. 63.
58 Chadwick, as cited, p. 97, says of the poem: "There can be no reasonable doubt that it was composed within a few years, possibly even
indeed in a sense we may say the Heroic Age itself—owes its origin to contemporary compositions which glorify the hero's exploit immediately after the event. "The chief object which the characters of the Heroic Age set before themselves," Chadwick continues, "was to 'win glory'—to have their fame celebrated for all time," and such glory was to be won by brave deeds. "Let him, who can," is the sentiment of Beowulf, "win for himself glory before he dies; that is the best thing which can come to a warrior in after times, when he is no more." In the heroic age, the deeds celebrated and the glory attained were alike personal, and the hero neither hesitated to boast of his own prowess nor to reward others for singing his praises. "The great works of commemoration," Hirn says, "are all monuments of boasting. By the grandiloquent hieroglyphies on palaces and pyramids and by the extolling hymns that he orders to be sung in his praise, the exultant hero endeavors to win from future admirers a need of praise which shall quench his thirst for glorification. Even in this case, therefore, history, in its psychological sense—that is, the concentration of attention upon times other than the present—has been born of pride. By relying on this emotionalistic interpretation," he proceeds, "we can explain the otherwise extraordinary development of commemorative art amongst tribes on relatively low stages of intellectual development. The same explanation also accounts for the artistic value of the primitive records. The intensely emotional element of exultation, pride, and boasting that pervades so many of the commemorative poems and dramas makes this kind of history an art in the proper sense of the word."

With the passing of time, the once-contemporary heroic narrative came to relate to long-past deeds. How the content of the story suffered in transmission and retelling need not here be

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months, of the battle." F. J. Snell says: "It is a contemporary history permeated by the spirit and illumined with the art of heroic poetry. . . . It is not a mere tale to amuse, but a trumpet-call to the courage and patriotism of the nation, which, in some quarters, were evidently beginning to flag." The Age of Alfred (London, 1912), p. 114.

50 Chadwick, as cited, pp. 87, 88, 97, 325 ff., 339.

60 Hirn, as cited, p. 181.
considered at length; suffice it to say that "the epic poem is cut loose and set free from history, and goes on a way of its own."61 The facts disappear, and all that remains is the emotional impression that the earlier poetry conveyed. Thus "all that is constant, or common, in the different poetical reports of Attila, is that he was great. What touches the mind of the poet out of the depths of the past is nothing but the tradition, undefined, of something lordly."62 The sort of history embedded in the epic, therefore, may be compared with that retained in the popular mind in regard to such national heroes as Washington and Lincoln. The epic poet, Professor Ker continues, "is bound to the past, in one way; it is laid upon him to tell the stories of the great men of his own race," and "it does not matter in what particular form the history may be represented, so long as in some form or other the power of the national glory is allowed to pass into his work."63

At this point, Aristotle's discussion of poetry and history inevitably forces itself upon attention.64 The dictum which everyone remembers is that "the distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse—you might put the work of Herodotus into verse, and it would still be a species of history." The distinction between them "consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be."65 Stated again, the

61 Ker, as cited, p. 27.
62 Ker, as cited, p. 28.
63 Ker, as cited, p. 28. Cf. S. H. Butcher, as cited below, p. 402: "Much of the poetry of the Greeks might be called authentic history—true not in precision of detail or in the record of personal adventures, but in its indication of the larger outlines of events and in its embodiment in ideal form of the past deeds of the race."
64 See S. H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (3rd ed., London, 1902); and Ingram Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Oxford, 1909); we are fortunate in having in these editions equally fine examples of two different types of critical scholarship.
65 Poetics, IX, 2, tr. Bywater, p. 27; cf. Butcher, p. 35.
distinction is that "poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular." By 'the particular' Aristotle means what, for example, Alcibiades did or suffered; by 'the universal' he means "how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity." That is, "given a personage of a certain character and in a certain position as the beginning of the story, all the rest must be the natural or necessary consequence of this initial situation." 

"The element of 'universality' in Greek Tragedy, as Aristotle understands it, means no more than is indicated in his present distinction between a poem and a history; and it is in no wise peculiar to Tragedy. Aristotle tells us it was to be seen in the Comedy of his time; and it is found in just the same way in the modern novel—even in the historical and in the so-called realistic novel. In all these forms of imaginative literature the personages are, as we say, 'characters,' in other words, ideal personalities, made to act and speak in accordance with the law of character which the author has assumed for each." 67

As thus stated by Aristotle, the contrast between history and poetry appears self-evident; in reality, however, it is an invention of the critic: the element of 'universality' is found in historiography as well as in tragic or epic poetry. The fact is, Aristotle, on the one hand, considers only the finished product of the dramatist—not the artist's way of working—and, on the other, he ignores entirely the treatment of character in historiography. The Greek tragic poet did not begin with the conception of "a person of a certain character," but with legends (or histories)68 whose outcome was predetermined and known. "By consecrated usage the tragedian was confined to a circle of legends whose main outlines were already fixed." "The great facts of the legends could not be set aside." "The details of the story might vary within wide limits, but the end was a thing given; and in the drama the end cannot but dominate the structure of the whole—incidents and character alike." 69 In Greek

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67 Bywater, as cited, p. 189.
68 "Aristotle himself speaks of the myths as history," Butcher, p. 402.
69 Butcher, as cited, pp. 356–57.
tragedy, then, the end of the story was the dramatist's starting-point, and from this he worked back to a beginning. The invention of the author was concerned, not with displaying the consequences that would follow upon a given character being placed in a certain initial situation, but with presenting such a character as would make the known outcome appear rational and inevitable—not indeed in terms of the commonplaces of ordinary life, but setting forth the highest possibilities of human nature in the stress of unwonted circumstances. Now, from the time of Herodotus to the present day, historians have devoted themselves to an exactly similar undertaking; they have described great and serious events in the light of their outcome, and have sought to make the deeds of heroes intelligible by the imaginative reconstruction of character. "It is in the realizing of grand character," Stubbs says, "that the strength of historical genius chiefly displays itself," and a more recent observer has remarked that "the only peculiar province of written history is in dealing with individual character and influence." In this important particular, therefore, historiography is indistinguishable from imaginative literature.

"The history of a political community is analogous to an epic or dramatic composition, or to a novel; inasmuch as they both narrate a succession of human acts and sufferings."  


72 In order that the force of the foregoing statement may be fully appreciated, the following extracts, taken at random from a late volume (XXIX) of the English Historical Review, are subjoined. "We prefer her treatment of a really heroic character. . . . Her analysis of the marshal's character is just and illuminating" (H. W. C. Davis, pp. 145, 146). "Mr. Williams has built up the first credible and convincing portrait of his hero. . . . On the character of Chatham, both as man and as statesman, Mr. Williams is absolutely satisfactory" (W. L. Grant, p. 380). "It is in the judgment of persons that one finds most to seek. Mr. Vickers never seems to have a hero, and the general depreciation of most of the great names which figure in his pages has a somewhat depressing effect on the reader. This is conspicuously the case with the kings and members of the royal house" (C. L. Kingsford, p. 555).

"La tâche de l'historien ne diffère pas en ecle de celle du dramaturge ou du romancier. Comme eux, il doit assigner des rôles, combiner des scènes, préparer des effets, graduer l'intérêt et faire que le lecteur ne s'ennuie pas un instant."

It has been a serious detriment to the study of historiography that Aristotle regarded history as annals. "In Aristotle's view a history is a chronicle, or register, of events taken just as they came in order of time, however separate and disconnected they may have been in themselves." In poetic story, on the other hand, there must be unity and logical coherence of the parts; the action must be a whole with a beginning, middle, and end. Thus, from Aristotle's point of view, "poetry in virtue of its higher subject-matter and of the closer and more organic union of its parts acquires an ideal unity that history never possesses."

The two things that are here set over against one another are not commensurable. Aristotle compares epic, a highly-wrought form of historic art in which the emotion awakened by past deeds has liberated itself from the burden of fact, and annals, the skeleton of history, but not yet history itself because the dry bones have not been clothed with flesh and endowed with the spirit of life. The contrast, as formulated by Aristotle, is extreme, but since historiography has followed the precedent of Herodotus and Thucydides, which to all appearance Aristotle condemned, the discussion can no longer be maintained on the lines which he laid down. In historiography, as distinct from annals, the first consideration—as in tragedy—is the 'action,' and the problem confronting every historian is how to bring

75 Bywater, as cited, p. 187; cf. p. 306.
76 Butcher, as cited, p. 185.
77 Bywater thinks (p. 305) a correction is required in Poetics XXIII, 1, 1459a21, as the accepted reading 'makes him say that our ordinary histories should not be like tragedies or epics, as though there were something in the practice of the historians that he wished to set right.' So far am I from being disposed to admit 'the absurdity of such a notion,' that even the beauty of Bywater's suggested emendation does not shake the belief that Aristotle was out of sympathy with the tendencies that found expression, say, in the history of Ephorus.
the heterogeneous materials at his disposal within the compass of a unity.

"The dramatic action . . . is a coherent series of events, standing in organic relation to one another and bound together by the law of cause and effect. The internal centre, the pivot round which the whole system turns, is the plot." 78

The type of unity in historiography differs in an important particular from that of tragedy; a point the more deserving of notice since Aristotle (iv. 10) states that tragedy succeeded epic. In early heroic poetry, the 'action' is simple, being concerned with the deeds of individual heroes. In the Homeric epic, however, the scope of the narrative has significantly widened. "The story and the deeds of those who pass across its wide canvas are linked with the larger movement of which the men themselves are but a part. The particular action rests upon forces outside itself. The hero is swept into the tide of events. The hairbreadth escapes, the surprises, the episodes, the marvelous incidents of epic story, only partly depend on the spontaneous energy of the hero." "The epic poem," in short, "relates a great and complete action which attaches itself to the fortunes of a people, or to the destiny of mankind." Tragedy, on the other hand, "represents the destiny of the individual man." In tragic drama "it is but seldom that outward circumstances are entirely dominant over the forces of the spirit." 79 Obviously, then, tragedy in succeeding to epic does not carry over that notable outlook in which the fate of the individual appears subordinated to the fortunes of a group. Aristotle's words are applicable to the surface-continuity of subject-matter between epic and tragedy—the Athenian tragedies utilized the epic poems—but he does not remark the less immediately apparent continuity of treatment between epic and historiography, even though Herodotus had succeeded to the width of vision of a Homer.

In the wonderful creative outburst that followed the Persian War, drama and history, springing from the same root in epic,

78 Butcher, as cited, p. 348.
79 Butcher, as cited, p. 353.
so completely developed their special types of appeal that they appear to us, as to Polybius (ii. 56), "widely opposed to each other." Tragedy, even at the beginning, assumed "the point of view which takes the human mind to be the essence in all drama." The interest of the dramatist lies in the common destiny of individual men; and he presents the individual human soul struggling in the self-woven toils of fate. History, in a wholly different spirit, presents the group through the activities of its representative men. The dramatist speaks for all men; the historian for the men of his own time and country. The dramatist identifies himself emotionally with "characters," the historian identifies himself with a particular nation. We, the auditors, recognize in any drama what might happen to ourselves personally, and in any history what might befall our own country. In neither case is there "teaching" as such; there is simply the clear and definite picture of an outcome—black-visaged or triumphant—and the means—folly or devotion, treachery or single-ness of will—by which it came to be.

It is not the fate of individuals with which history is concerned, but of nations. Yet, inasmuch as the group is only to be seen in the named individuals who represent it, there is an insistent tendency on the part of historians to lose the wider vision and follow the traditions of drama. The tendency is obvious in classical historiography owing to the convention, inherited from epic poetry, that permitted the introduction of speeches; but the admiration of modern historical scholars for Thucydides and Tacitus (in each of whom the dramatic attitude was pronounced), the persistent emphasis on "character-drawing," and the far-reaching attraction of historical romance, show the danger in which the art of Herodotus ever stands from the rival art of Aeschylus and Sophocles.

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The characteristic 'action' in historiography presents the issue of a crucial struggle between different groups, societies, or nations; and the histories that men have chosen to keep in
remembrance have been inspired by bitter conflicts. This distinctive schema appears fully developed, at the beginning of prose historiography, in Herodotus. In its first form, the work of the "Father of History" consisted merely of the story of the Persian invasion now comprised in the last three books.\(^8^0\) The author thus began with the narrative of a single war which was to him recent history. This was a story, simple in action, conceived in the old heroic spirit, of a victory won against overwhelming odds. The account was one that redounded to the glory of Athens and flattered Athenian pride. Herodotus represented the Athenians as "truly the saviours of Greece;" but "he did more: he gave currency and authority to a story which embodied Athenian tradition and justified Athenian empire." "If the story is true," Bury remarks, "that the Athenians bestowed on him ten talents in recognition of the merits of his work, it was a small remuneration for the service he rendered to the renown of their city."\(^8^1\)

At some later point in his career, Herodotus came to have a new vision of the war, seeing in it the culmination of different converging series of events, and it is in this later form that his history has won the undying admiration of men. Some danger there has been in modern times that the appreciation of his supreme artistry might be obscured by the interest taken by scholars in the details of his subject-matter. Herodotus is, indeed, one thing to the student of ancient history; another to the investigator of the growth of historical criticism; and yet a third to the historian of historiographic literature. "It is something," Macan says, "to have written the best story-book in Greek literature, perhaps in European literature. No other Greek writer has covered so large a world with so full a population of living and immortal men and women as Herodotus (no, not even his master, Homer). The work of Herodotus is a prose Iliad and Odyssey in one, rich in episodes and details, and

\(^8^0\) Herodotus, IV-VI, ed. by R. W. Macan (London, 1805), I, xciii.

more indisputably one and indivisible than either Epos.\textsuperscript{782} This appreciation may be taken to illustrate the kind of interest that has charmed countless men and women in all ages; it does not, however, touch the element that entitles the work of Herodotus to its high place as a history. What constitutes it a master-piece of historical writing is the wide vision that gives unity to the whole narrative.\textsuperscript{83} This vision is inseparable from the emotion in the light of which it is beheld. Whether the Persians retired unbeaten, having effected their object, or whether the honor of their repulse should be accorded to the arms of Sparta, is, in this connection, immaterial; what matters is that Athens was remade, intellectually reborn, as a result of the war. The first form of the work of Herodotus may well be set down as the expression of a pardonable vainglory; the enlargement, on the other hand, reflects not merely pride in achievement, but, what is of the highest significance, the ambition born of victory—the inspiration of which, for a moment, made all things seem possible; the dream that led Athens to defeat and Alexander to conquest.

The work of Herodotus is of the type of history that narrates the details of a recent event, with a prefatory account of the circumstances that led up to it. In such works the focus is the dénouement as it appears to the author; the unity is inspired by the outcome. Furthermore, it is characteristic of this type that in proportion as the event is felt to be decisive will there be a marked tendency to look upon the present outcome as determining the future. Of this type, Polybius, especially in view of his self-conscious explanation, is an interesting example.

\begin{quote}
"Now in the times preceding this period," he says, "the events of the world's history may be said to have happened in a state of isolation,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{82}Mecan, as cited, I, lxxiii, and cf. cxvii-viii.

\textsuperscript{83}``Mais lorsque les Perses arrivèrent, et repartirent vaincus, une admirable matière s'offrit aux artistes. Non seulement les victoires de Marathon et de Salamine flattaient l'amour-propre national, et assuraient la réussite à quiconque parlerait d'elles, mais elles fournissaient un moyen facile d'ordonner le chaos des événements... et seule la vanité d'un peuple triomphant put voir dans la conquête de l'Égypte et l'expédition de Scythie, des travaux d'approche contre la minuscule presqu'île hellénique.''

because each action, both in its inception and in its development, was disconnected with all others by time or place. But from this period we find that the history has become an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and Libya are bound up with those of Asia and Greece, and the general current of events sets to one fixed point.' "The distinctive feature of our work," he goes on to say, "corresponds with the marvellous characteristic of our times; for as Fortune has swayed almost all the affairs of the world to one centre, and compelled every force to set in one and the same direction, so we would by means of our History bring under a common view, for the benefit of our readers, the operations which Fortune has employed for the completion of a combined system of the world. Indeed it was this above everything that incited and urged us to attempt the writing of history." 84

The theme of Roman conquest unified the work of Polybius; at the same time, the far-reaching success of the Republic led him to look towards the future, for, he remarks (iii. 4). "it seemed agreed and forced on the conviction of all men, that all that remained to the world is to submit to the Romans, and to perform whatever they shall enjoin." The idea that the success of Rome introduced a unity into history is seen, therefore, to antedate the writings of Professor Freeman.

The extension of the power of Rome had, however, a wider influence on historiography than in affording an inspiration to Polybius. It may be said, indeed, to have forced upon men a second type of history, namely, that in which the past of a single nation is seen as a self-contained whole. This type, of which the great example in classical antiquity is the history of Livy, and which to us, owing to its cultivation in the nineteenth century, 85 may seem even the natural and proper form of history, was not only late in emerging, but even after its appearance suffered, in the Middle Ages, a long eclipse.

In Herodotus, everything leads up to the crisis of the Persian invasion and the happenings antecedent to this event fall within

84 Polybius, 1, 3, 4; tr. by J. L. Strachan-Davidson.
85 The historian's "work seems rather to be to display the development of a nation or of a period, and to record accurately, and in the light of the spirit of the nation or period, the sequence of events in which its character has manifested itself." Viscount Haldane, The Meaning of Truth in History (London, 1914), p. 10.
the "action" of the drama he presents, setting, as it were, the characters upon the stage and introducing the "complication." In Livy, the stimulus is also a crisis in the affairs of a people, but of a different kind. The author is not stirred to write by the outcome of a single war, nor is there a dramatic climax in his presentation. The crisis is, one may say, "unresolved;" it is present to the minds of Livy and his auditors, rather than depicted in his work. Livy's view is concentrated upon the internal history of the Roman people; he looks back from the height to which a long series of achievements has brought the Roman people, and sees at every step victory won by Roman piety, constancy, and discipline. The spirit in which he writes is not, however, that of exultation in victory, even though his theme is the ever-increasing glory of Rome; it is pride, certainly, but the pride of assured position, of conscious superiority. His pride is also of a contemplative sort: a mingling of regret for the noble virtues of former generations, of distrust in the present, and—far from an ambitious daring—an actual foreboding of the future. So he says in the memorable preface to his history:

"The subjects to which I would ask each of my readers to devote his earnest attention are these—the life and morals of the community; the men and the qualities by which through domestic policy and foreign war dominion was won and extended. Then as the standard of morality gradually lowers, let him follow the decay of the national character, observing how at first it slowly sinks, then slips downward more and more rapidly, and finally begins to plunge into headlong ruin, until he reaches these days, in which we can bear neither our diseases nor their remedies."

This is rhetoric surely, but it reveals the presence in the author's mind of a pictorial composition into which he is able to fit the abundant detail of his seven hundred years.

How or when the vision of Roman history as the expression of Roman character came to Livy we do not know, but, fortunately, among modern historians of the first rank more than one has
revealed the secret of his own creative experience. Michelet, for example, in the preface of 1869 to his *Histoire de France*, says:

""Cette œuvre laborieuse d'environ quarante ans fut conçue d'un moment, de l'éclair de Julliet [1830]. Dans ces jours mémorables, une grande lumière se fit, et j'aperçus la France. Elle avait des annales, et non point une histoire. Des hommes éminents l'avaient étudiée surtout au point de vue politique. Nul n'avait pénétré dans l'infini détail des développements divers de son activité. . . . Le premier je la vis comme une âme et une personne.'"

Gibbon's equally well-known account of the moment's inspiration that gave birth to the *Decline and Fall* may likewise be instanced:

""It was at Rome, on the fifteenth of October, 1764, that as I sat musing amidst the ruins of the Capitol, while the barefooted fryars were singing Vespers in the temple of Jupiter, that the idea of writing the decline and fall of the City first started to my mind.'" 86

These statements are so far characteristic that they might be cited in a handbook of psychology to illustrate what is perhaps the best-known type of the artist's way of working. The flash-like illumination is not, however, the first step, whatever appearances may suggest. Back of the sudden emergence of the vision or picture there lies of necessity a period of gestation and subconscious growth; and it is one of the remarkable features of Gibbon's autobiography that it enables us to trace in detail the course of the artist's brooding that preceded the most interesting moment in his literary life.

It was suggested earlier that the act of creation which is characteristic of art has its beginning when an experience is lived over in the mind of the artist and is remade by contemplation. The work of art is not a transcript or photograph of an experience, but the experience seen through the haze of the impression it has produced; it is not the utterance of personal

86 *The Autobiographies of Edward Gibbon*, ed. by John Murray (2d ed., London, 1897), p. 302. Cf. pp. 405-6: "'I must not forget the day, the hour, the most interesting in my literary life. It was on the fifteenth of October, in the gloom of evening, as I sat musing on the Capitol, while the barefooted fryars were chanting their litanies in the temple of Jupiter, that I conceived the first thought of my history. . . .'"
hope, fear, pride or anger, but the expression of such an emotion detached from its immediate relation to the artist.

Now the personal experience of the artist-historian who comes to write the history of his country is not of the actual events of the past, but of what others have said of these events. The historian "lives over" not scenes that he himself has witnessed but scenes that he has imagined from other men's descriptions. This mode of procedure is not peculiar to the historian; many dramatists and all historical novelists follow the same course. The function of imaginative literature is, however, as Aristotle says, to express "the universal," and this is accomplished by representing deeds or happenings as the outcome of character. Accepting the known issue of events, Shakespeare and Sir Walter Scott present the steps by which the individual introduced comes to act in a particular manner at a given crisis. The interest lies in the psychological problem of how a man of a certain character will act in certain circumstances. What is of importance to notice here is that the dramatist or novelist in following this course is on safe ground, for his delineation is true if it is recognized as true to human nature; but, contrariwise, the historian in pursuing the same road is on treacherous footing. "Character-drawing" for him rests only upon supposition and fantasy. The concern of drama and novel is the depiction of character; the concern of history is the statement of what has taken place in the past; and what to the one is truth, to the other is mere unsubstantial imagining.

It is evident, furthermore, that in going to the past for "situations" the dramatist and novelist, Shakespeare and Scott, do not limit themselves to what they find contained in the records they consult, but rely primarily upon the knowledge of men they have acquired through their own personal experience. In precisely the same manner, the experience of the artist-historian is not confined to what he reads; he carries with him to the statement of past events a vivid realization of what his country is in his own day. The great histories, as we have seen, are reflections of crises in national existences. The interest of the
historian is awakened by the changes and circumstances through which he himself lives; and the past is revivified for him in a far higher degree by momentous events of which he is a witness than by documentary discoveries. The artist is the consciousness of his fellows in respect to some particular aspect of life; the artist-historian is not less, but more susceptible to national feeling than the public of which he is the spokesman.

Patriotism and political partisanship are of all feelings the most difficult for a man to "get outside." Anger is wholly absorbing at the time; if a man is possessed by a passion of rage it is obvious that he cannot describe this passion to another; for the time being he is that passion, and reflection is impossible. Time, however, cools anger; and so, later on, the individual may describe the situation and the attendant circumstances—perhaps humorously, perhaps with a feeling of conscious pride. Time has, for him, exteriorized the passion and enabled him to see it detached from its immediate relation to himself. The direct expression of anger is not art; on the other hand, the exteriorized, detached, "distanced" view is the very core of aesthetic presentation. It would seem as if men found some almost insuperable obstacle in the way of exteriorizing or "distancing" political subjects. When political questions are the subject of discussion, passion is inevitably aroused—more especially in times of crisis. Loyalty, indeed, may be said to forbid the inhibition, the restraint, of such feelings. Misrepresentation of one's country stirs indignant protest, though the circumstances are a century old. The essence of patriotism is personal identification with one's

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87In this connection the historical student is urged to make himself familiar with the remarkable paper of Edward Bullough, "'Psychical Distance' as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle," British Journal of Psychology, 5 (1912), 87–118. Mr. Bullough says: "'Distance is obtained by separating the object and its appeal from one's own self, by putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends.' "It describes a personal relation, often highly emotionally coloured, but of a peculiar character. Its peculiarity lies in that the personal character of the relation has been, so to speak, filtered. It has been cleared of the practical, concrete nature of its appeal, without, however, thereby losing its original constitution" (p. 91). "There are two ways of losing Distance; either to 'under-distance' or to 'over-distance.' 'Under-distancing' is the commonest failing of the subject, an excess of Distance is a frequent failing of Art" (p. 94).
country, and so it comes that the knowledge of the past derived from records is realized as personal memory, and when the historian writes it is not as a spectator, but as one personally affected by the events. Thus it is that Mommsen said, out of a full experience, "Those who have lived through historical events, as I have, begin to see that history is neither written or made without love or hate." It is this intensity of personal feeling, inseparable from patriotism and politics, that, on the one hand, gives history its specific quality and, on the other, has remained the great obstacle to an historiographic art.

At this point there would seem to be ample justification for the remonstrances made in recent years against the principle of "impartiality"—upon which great weight has always been laid by historical methodologists. In his introductory note to The Cambridge Modern History, Mandell Creighton says: "In the vast and diversified area of modern history, the point of view determines the whole nature of the record, or else the whole work sinks to the level of a mass of details uninformed by any luminous idea. The writer who strives to avoid any tendency becomes dull, and the cult of impartiality paralyses the judgment." In the same vein, Cunningham remarks: "The claim to impartiality, on the part of the historian, seems to me to be unmeaning; and in so far as it has a meaning, is likely to be a mere affectation."

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88 Quoted in G. P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1913), p. 458. Note the attitude of Bishop Stubbs: "Without some infusion of spithe, " he says, "it seems as if history could not be written; that no man's zeal is roused to write unless it is moved by the desire to write down." Seventeen Lectures (Oxford, 1887), p. 126.

89 "The third distinctive note of the generation of writers who dug so deep a trench between history as known to our grandfathers and as it appears to us, is their dogma of impartiality." Lord Acton, A Lecture on the Study of History (London, 1896), p. 44. "Le premier devoir de l'historien est de se mettre au travail sans préjugé, sans colère, sans idée ni passion préconçues. Il s'abstraira de tous les sentiments de l'époque présente." Camille Jullian, Extraits des historiens français du xixe siècle (6e éd., Paris, 1910), p. exxvi.

90 William Cunningham, "Impartiality in History," Rivista di Scienza, 1 (1907), 121. Cf. G. M. Trevelyan, in Sociological Papers, (London, 1906), II, 229: "History must be thought about from some standpoint, and the cant of pure impartiality in history is only equalled by the cant of historical facts having value except as food for thought and speculation."
The claim of "impartiality" in historiography is unmeaning. Every student of history knows, however, that the reasons men give for their actions and advocacies rarely touch the actual aim of their endeavors. "Partiality" means that the historian takes sides, that he is affected by love and hate, that he "allows" himself to be influenced by personal and patriotic considerations—that he is Memory's mouthpiece for his countrymen. The demand for "impartiality" is just the unconscious recognition of the need of "distance" in history-writing.

Modern writers have not improved upon the statement of the case for "impartiality" made by Polybius in speaking of Philinus and Fabius.

"Judging from their lives and principles, I do not suppose," he says, "that these writers have intentionally stated what was false; but I think that they are much in the same state of mind as men in love. Partisanship and complete prepossession made Philinus think that all the actions of the Carthaginians were characterised by wisdom, honour, and courage: those of the Romans by the reverse. Fabius thought the exact opposite. Now," Polybius continues, "in other relations of life one would hesitate to exclude such warmth of sentiment: for a good man ought to be loyal to his friends and patriotic to his country; ought to be at one with his friends in their hatreds and their likings. But directly a man assumes the moral attitude of an historian he ought to forget all considerations of that kind."

The obvious propriety of this "ought" has won verbal acceptance of a principle that no historian has been able to apply as a rule of life. Far indeed from its being appropriate that the national historian should dehumanize himself for his task, the very terms of his undertaking make him the representative of the loyalty that "good men" feel for their friends, and the spokesman of that patriotism which is the spirit of national unity. While, however, the "ought" of Polybius has been regarded by later historians as a moral principle, the object of Polybius himself was to introduce a means whereby the historian might, as he says, hold himself "entirely aloof from his fellows"—his aim was to create the "distance" necessary for art by the interposition of moral judgments.

91 Polybius, i, 14; tr. by E. S. Shuckburgh.
How the problem of "distance" was recognized and dealt with by the greatest of historical artists is disclosed in Gibbon's autobiographies—to which we now return. Gibbon's success was not due, as has frequently been suggested, to some fortunate accident that gave him a great subject, nor yet to the brilliance of his style or his accuracy of statement; it was due to the deliberation with which he approached the writing of history, and the pains he was at to rule out, so far as was humanly possible, every element of failure. There is this peculiarity about historiography as an art that, on the one hand, the author must produce a work of sufficient proportions to have his claims to distinction considered, and that, on the other, the compass of life rarely permits of his profiting by earlier experiences to achieve a later triumph. Gibbon's fame rests upon a single work.

The reader of the autobiographies will recollect that from youth onward he "aspired to the character of an historian." Before the illumination that gave him his subject, he had spent years in search of a suitable topic. Thus he had been much occupied with the thought of writing upon some period of English history—Richard I attracted him, as did the Wars of the Barons, the exploits of the Black Prince, and the lives of Sir Philip Sydney and Sir Walter Raleigh. As his ideas matured, however, Gibbon eliminated the English subjects from consideration. In July 1762, he wrote in his diary: "I am afraid of being reduced to drop my Hero [Raleigh] . . . Could I even surmount these obstacles [which he has detailed], I should shrink with terror from the modern history of England, where every character is a problem, and every reader a friend or an enemy; where a writer is supposed to hoist a flag of party, and is devoted to damnation by the adverse faction." "I must," he concludes, "embrace a safer and more extensive theme." "The history of the origin and establishment of the liberty of the Swiss" next engaged his attention—Switzerland having become for him a second home. This "glorious theme" proved so attractive that

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Gibbon actually wrote a "first book," which was badly received and so abandoned. He was conscious, he said, that he had not attained "the genuine style, the middle tone, of that species of writing." Thus, after years of study and deliberation, he decided against writing the history of either of the countries to which he was emotionally attached. That is, Gibbon discovered that the characteristic interest or emotion of national history stood in the way of the production of a work of art: on the one hand, he could not achieve "the middle tone," and, on the other, his audience could not, in reading, overcome their political feelings. After consideration of the outstanding problems of historiography, he found that what has here been called "distance" was to be achieved only in relation to a period remote from the embarrassment of political or patriotic emotion.

Here it may well appear to one who reflects upon the effect produced by the histories he has read that "distance" is, in actuality, a marked characteristic of older historical writings. This is undoubtedly true; but the "distancing" in these cases is not due to the skill of the artist; it is the effect of time. The work of an earlier historian, paradoxical as it may seem, may be "distanced" art for us, though "underdistanced" for the generation in which it was written. This is, however, merely the corollary of the fact that while the emotion expressed in the first instance is that of the author's present, the emotion conveyed is that of the reader's present. Consequently, if the reader is no longer affected by the immediacy of the political feeling expressed by the historian, what was "underdistanced" for a contemporary may be art for him. The ambitious writer will, nevertheless, scarcely be content with the possibility that this fortuitous circumstance suggests. A work which is not art in the first place—the "standard" history of its day that Mark Pattison refers to—is much more likely to be forgotten than to be appreciated by later generations. On the other hand, a great work of art, such as Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, retains its prestige in despite of

93 *Autobiographies*, as cited, pp. 195-96, 276, 408.
Time, though its statements may be challenged in detail by Teutonic and Slavonic "researchers."

What art does is to create clear and definite objects or pictures, which awaken emotion (but not partisanship or antagonism), and satisfy the reader by "that harmony and sense of the inevitableness which only a work of art can give." Consciously or unconsciously, it is at the creation of just such "clear and definite objects" that the historian aims. Stubbs illustrates this when he speaks of the historian's work as "an artistic unity, a perfect image, true to its author's idea." The great obstacle to his success lies in the fact that, owing apparently to a naïve self-distrust or timidity, he invariably regards historiography through the eyes of the critic, and hesitates to consider himself in the light of a creative artist. There is, in fact, a chill in the air when the modern historical scholar comes to discuss the writing of history, and the source of this chill may be detected in the context of the phrase just quoted from Stubbs. "The result will," he says, "be an artistic unity, a perfect image, true to the author's idea, and," he continues, "if he has not let his own idea prejudice him in the manipulation of his materials, true to the reality, so far as the reality can be discovered." The "if" here is the academic doubt. The scholar-historian is to be an artist, but he is, at the same time, to distrust the inspiration and question the vision without which art is impossible. It is against this misapplication of the critical spirit that men like Creight on and Cunningham rise in protest. It is indeed only by reliance on the artist's vision that the "impartiality"—the "distance"—demanded is to be attained. Vision is not surrender

[94] Stubbs, as cited, p. 112. Caird has aptly described the procedure of the historian: "Ranging over the vast mass of seemingly heterogeneous materials with which he has to deal, and impelled simply by the unconscious effort after unity of effect, he seizes intuitively on the events that have gone to mould or that express the spirit of an age or the characteristic genius of a people." University Addresses (Glasgow, 1899), pp. 244-45. Cf. Albert Sorel, Nouveaux essais d'histoire et de critique (Paris, 1898), p. 12: "Toute la méthode, tout l'art de l'historien consistant à exercer, à perfectionner cette faculté naturelle de retenir l'image des objets, de réunir les images, de les grouper, d'en former une image totale et persistante. L'homme compose l'histoire comme il compose les souvenirs de sa propre vie."
to personal passion. "'So far from being self-expression, artistic production is the indirect formulation of a distanced mental content,'" and this subconscious formulation is realized consciously in the flash-like illumination that has been illustrated from the experience of Michelet and Gibbon.

Historiography, then, is no mere colorless product of scholarship. It is the mental reflection of the consciousness of national existence, it is the memory of what men cherish in the life of the nation to which they belong. It is the expression of the spirit of the community that gives it birth, and takes new forms as that spirit expands. This is true whether the historian writes of recent times or of times remote. A Mommsen, Ferrero or Eduard Meyer may present the picture of a distant past, but he speaks always with the voice of his own generation, and gives utterance to the ideas and aspirations of his own community. The historian, far from being open to condemnation, is true to his calling when he follows his "'natural impulses, like the common run of men,'" for he does not write as a scholar, but as the spokesman of a people.

From the days of the Greeks down to the present, there has been a constant tendency among historians to discuss the utility of history. If, now, ceasing to repeat what Thucydides and Polybius said, we examine the evidence, it will be to find that, in giving expression to national pride, history provides a body of ideas which serves to unify the attitude of the individuals of a nation towards their common country; in fact, the feeling of nationality is due primarily to a common pride in past events.

95 Bullough, as cited, p. 115.

96 "'The Reformation quickened history into a new life, as it quickened the world; the consciousness of national existence, of which it was the outcome, naturally sought its vindication in the study which is, after all, but the mental reflection of that consciousness.'" J. R. Green, Historical Studies (London, 1903), p. 56.
"Le véritable patriotisme n'est pas l'amour du sol, c'est l'amour du passé, c'est le respect pour les générations qui nous ont précédés." Historians follow close upon the movements of race and of people; their "invention," their originality, consists chiefly in vitalizing old materials, in interpreting the records in the light of the present, in recreating and ever renewing the memory of the past. The potency of this type of emotionalized information for inducing unity of sentiment and action is one of the notable discoveries of the nineteenth century; by this means the spirit of small nations has been resuscitated, and the imagination of greater units has been fired to the point of aggression. It is to the efforts of historians that the awakening of patriotism during the last century is to be attributed.

From such recognition of the influence of historians it is but a step to say with Gabriel Monod: "L'histoire travaille d'une manière secrète et sûre à la grandeur de la Patrie en même temps qu'au progrès du genre humain." Indeed, not only


98 "In Germany at least it was the dynasty of historians, and not the abstract men, who supplied the final clenches for public opinion and national resolution." Lord Morley, Notes on Politics and History (New York, 1914), p. 183.

The discovery was, as is well known, that of Stein. In 1829, he wrote: "In the year 1818 I gave an impulse to this undertaking, because I thought it for the honour of the nation to collect and set out properly the monuments of its history, because I considered history an efficacious means of exciting patriotism, and sustaining it against the influence of self-interest." See Sir J. R. Seeley, Life and Times of Stein (Cambridge, 1878), III, 499; cf. pp. 441 ff.


99 Lord Acton, "Nationality?" [1862], in his History of Freedom, and other Essays (London, 1907), pp. 270-300; and "German Schools of History" [1886], in his Historical Essays & Studies (London, 1908), p. 348. Also H. M. Stephens, "Modern Historians and their Influence on Small Nationalities," Contemporary Review, 52 (1887), 107-121; for the later views of Professor Stephens see his address, "Nationality and History," American Historical Review, 21 (1916), 225-236. The Earl of Cromer's article on "The Teaching of Patriotism," Nineteenth Century and After, 78 (1915), 1012-20, should also be read in this connection.

100 Revue historique, 1 (1876), 38. The practical application of this view appears in the advice of Zurbonsen: "Studiere die Geschichte als
has history-writing in the nineteenth century awakened dormant emotions, it has incited peoples to action with visions of the future. Success, as in the case of Athens, leads on ambition; and the historian, like Herodotus, justifies the forward policy. "Through recounting or representing the exploits of earlier generations," Hirn says, "the descendants acquire that healthy feeling of pride which is the most important factor of success" in the struggle for national existence, and now that primitive modes of excitation are out of date history-teachers take the place of the seops and scalds of our forefathers. History, like any art, is not to be judged by what it becomes under the tutelage of mediocrities, but by what it is in the hands of great men; it is not merely a vehicle for the training of critics or a literature suitable for the promotion of general culture, but it is a great moving spirit in the open world and a living force inspiring the actions of men.

The foregoing analysis has been undertaken for the reason that in discussions upon historical method there is a marked tendency to assert what, it is thought, historiography should be, and an equally marked neglect to observe what it actually has been and is. There is, indeed, something remarkable in the fact that historical study should be involved in difficulties because historical scholars, in dealing with their own subject, clinging tenaciously to the absolute or philosophical, as opposed to the relative or historical method of criticism. One of the great


102 'The strongest and most impressive personalities, it is true, like Macaulay, Thiers, and the two greatest of living writers [1895], Mommsen and Treitschke, project their own broad shadow upon their pages. This is a practice proper to great men, and a great man may be worth several immaculate historians." Lord Acton, A Lecture on the Study of History (London, 1896), p. 30.

103 'The [philosophical] point of view implies the existence of definite standards and clear principles; the [historical] leads us to the great
services of the "method of origins" is that it enables us, by going back to a point where our personal judgments are not immediately involved, to follow up the line of advance, and, as it were, to take our prepossessions in the rear. In no subject would this procedure appear to be more necessary than in that now under consideration; and what the historical study of historiography renders conspicuous is the property-interest of the community in the recital of the story of its past. "History," the record of what men of the same group cherish in common, is a literature that cannot readily be superseded or replaced, because it fills a definite social need. To provide materials for this record is no unworthy object of research; and, indeed, there would seem to be an obligation upon scholars to serve their fellows by bringing old deeds and reputations to the test of "what it was that actually happened."

Nevertheless, there maintains itself in the minds of present-day scholars a hope that the study of history may possibly be directed to other ends than the satisfying of national vainglory; and the plea that history should be studied for its own sake represents a striving, as yet not wholly conscious of its aim, toward something different. It must be evident from what has gone before that the primary obstacle in the way of historical inquiry leading to scientific results lies in the subordination of inquiry to historiography. Such, however, is the vitality of the tradition in the presence of which the historian lives that he finds it difficult to conceive of "history" as presented in other form than that of chronologized narrative, and so adheres with pertinacity to a type of historical composition that antedates the first beginnings of criticism among the Greeks.

It might now seem the obvious course to proceed with a statement of the means to be adopted by historical investigators

problem of historical genesis. In the first instance we refer the subject we are interested in to standards and principles, which we must either assume or demonstrate; in the latter case we connect the object of our study historically with its antecedents and surroundings in time and place." J. T. Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1912), III, 131.
having for their aim the achievement of scientific results. The road, however, is not yet clear, for in defense of orthodoxy and tradition it is now declared that "logic has at length justified the historical method"—meaning historiography—and hence it becomes necessary to consider the relation in which History stands to Philosophy.
IV
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

1

The mind of a thinking being is largely occupied in making constructions; impressions come to us and we fit them into our own schemes of thought. Our constructions, conscious or unconscious, are framed for the purpose of setting up an intelligent conception of the world we live in, and Philosophy and Science are the two methods available for the attainment of this object. Philosophy regards the universe as a totality, and adopts the view that the significance of any part depends upon the meaning of the whole. The philosopher may be said to look upon the universe as a work of art. For him it is made up of details, but is not a mere aggregate; it is a whole or unity in which the details acquire a significance that does not attach to them taken separately. In a work of art, and in the universe as the philosopher views it, the whole is something more than the sum of all its parts; and this conception finds expression in the doctrine that analysis always falsifies, because the parts of a complex whole are different, as contained in that whole, from what they would otherwise be. Science, on the other hand, maintains that any view of the whole must be in conformity with what is known of the parts, and so, putting off the entire question of "meaning," devotes itself to the laborious undertaking of dissecting and sorting the objects of experience. In either case, it should be observed, the construction is an hypothesis; but whereas the hypotheses of science relate to strands or factors of which more than one example is to be found in the world, those of philosophy relate to a unique thing, the universe itself, so that verification by comparison is here impossible. It follows that while the constructions of science may be tested by reference to objective actualities, those of philosophy can be criticized only in respect
to their self-consistency in thought—Philosophy, as Kant remarked, is constructed out of the resources of reason.

"The essence of philosophy lies in the connected vision of the totality of things, maintaining in every point the subordination of every element and factor to every other element and factor as conditioned by the totality. It may be compared to the best theory of Impressionism. You may perfect your detail and finish as much as you please, but there is one inexorable condition. Lose subordination to the whole and all is lost. You must never violate the singleness of the impression." ¹

It will be seen, then, that the philosopher is in the position of assuming that we may grasp the meaning of the entire complex of existence while remaining in ignorance of the factors or strands of which this is made up. There will be little difficulty in appreciating the fact that any such construction can be but a temporary expedient which must be abandoned or revised with every new contribution to knowledge made by science. Philosophy is an expression of the human desire to arrive at an understanding of the significance of life and human endeavor on the basis of the knowledge available at any given time. In contradistinction to this point of view, the scientist is in the position of asserting that we must first identify and name the objects to be discussed if we are ever to become mutually intelligible to each other. From his experience of the difficulty of verifying hypotheses in limited fields, he is distrustful of hypotheses framed to describe "wholes." From his experience of the mind's way of working, he distrusts all constructions that proceed "from the resources of reason;" and he cannot concede that our interpretations of the exterior world can be justified by their consistency in thought.

Historically speaking, all forms of inquiry were originally conducted in accordance with the method of philosophy, and it has been but slowly that one field after another has come to be placed upon a scientific footing. With the rise of many new sciences in modern times, philosophy has seen its old supremacy challenged, and has been forced to define its field with reference to the activities of science. It is admitted that "the need which

modern philosophy has of the particular sciences in their modern form is urgent and indispensable." The exact status of this dependence has, however, been the subject of an indeterminate debate. A view widely accepted is that of Professor Paulsen: "Philosophy," he says, "cannot be separated from the sciences; it is simply the sum-total of all scientific knowledge." "The most important distinction," Sidgwick says, "is that the sciences concentrate attention on particular parts or aspects of the knowable world, abstracting from the rest; while it is, in contrast, the essential characteristic of philosophy that it aims at putting together the parts of knowledge thus attained into a systematic whole; so that all methods of attaining truth may be grasped as parts of one method; and all the conclusions attained may be presented, so far as possible, as harmonious and consistent." Philosophy, then, takes the world as science finds it; but does not on that account admit a subordination of function. On the contrary, it assumes that the devotion of the man of science to his restricted problem, by limiting his outlook, renders him incapable of a comprehensive grasp of what is possible to science as a whole. Hence philosophy undertakes the formulation of a wider synthesis than is possible to any one of the sciences; not that the complete unification and systematisation of knowledge lies beyond the province of science, but since this is "the goal of science as a whole, it cannot be the task of a particular individual discipline." That is, philosophy in its endeavor to deal


4 Henry Sidgwick, Philosophy, its Scope and Relations (London, 1902), p. 11. Compare Abel Rey, La philosophie moderne (Paris, 1908), pp. 360-61: "Pourquoi la philosophie ne serait-elle pas, de même façon, une synthèse générale de toutes les connaissances scientifiques, un effort pour se représenter l'inconnu en fonction du connu afin d'aider à sa découverte et de maintenir l'esprit scientifique dans sa véritable orientation? Elle ne différerait de la science que par la plus grande généralité de l'hypothèse; la théorie philosophique, au lieu d'être la théorie d'un groupe de faits isolés et bien délimités, serait la théorie de l'ensemble des faits que la nature nous présente."

with experience as a whole, as a systematic unity, is dependent upon the results of the special sciences, and must continually revise its judgments as scientific knowledge expands.

It is, furthermore, necessary to point out that the modern philosopher occupies himself with criticism rather than with construction, and regards as his particular province the criticism of the methods, as well as the analysis of the fundamental conceptions and assumptions of the sciences. In other words, the scientist is intent upon his own enterprise; the "philosopher comes into being as one who is interested in observing what it is that the scientist is so intently doing." Here, again, philosophy follows science; and it is of the utmost importance in the present connection to observe that, while it investigates methodology, philosophy, logic, or science of knowledge, does not devise methods for men of science to follow. "As the sciences progress in actual insight they have to complete, improve, refine, and extend their methods;" the logician simply analyses the methods actually employed by the sciences at a given time. "It is not the business of the logician," Rashdall says, "to lay down rules for the guidance of scientific men. In so far as logic is concerned with the actual methods of particular sciences, the logician must rather analyse the methods actually employed in those sciences up to the present than to attempt to prescribe a priori the methods that they must follow." "Each branch of learning has its own methods, and the method can only be acquired by familiarity with the science itself." Logic does not justify, it describes method.

A good illustration of the procedure of logic is provided in the description of the method of the historian given by J. G. Hibben: "To

(London, 1901), p. 239. The special sciences, "in all cases, are limited in their scope, and evade the ultimate problems which their subject-matters suggest. Metaphysics, on the other hand, aims at completeness of view, and seeks to press all its questions home." J. S. Mackenzie, Outlines of Metaphysics (London, 1902), p. 10.

7 Wilhelm Windelband, in Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences, tr. by B. E. Meyer (London, 1913), I, 43.
solve the special and the general problems of history, recourse is had to an analysis of events on the basis of well-established psychological results. The phenomena of history are substantially the activities of man, both in his individual and collective capacities. Events being given, an hypothesis concerning the motives, and ends which actuated them, is framed upon the supposition that men ordinarily are impelled by similar motives under similar circumstances, in order to achieve similar ends. Here the analogies drawn between men of the present and men of the past, or between men moving in the ordinary routine of every-day life and men whose acts may be epoch-making, furnish a basis for historical interpretation." 9

What the scientist may hope to find in the discussions of logicians is not a justification of his own procedure, but a fuller analysis of its implications than he himself is able to carry out; the historical student may utilize logic as a mirror and discover, if he will, the aspect which his endeavor presents to the outside world, or as a means to enhance that self-consciousness of his own mental processes which is a prerequisite of successful scientific work. If, then, we turn to logic, as to a candid friend, it will be to discover that history is the narrative of certain unique happenings particularised by names and dates, and selected by an individual writer as of value or worth in relation to a given set of ideas. In short, the analysis of logic demonstrates that the relationship of history is with philosophy, not with science—and there are even philosophers who hold the opinion "that History is Philosophy and Philosophy History." 10

At this point, the inevitable difficulty over the use of words has of recent years become prominent. Men "think" history as an after-one-another procession of events, each one emerging somehow from what has gone before, and they assume that every occurrence is particular and unrepeatable. It is urged that in the world of everyday reality, the concrete world of experience, the world of action and of men, there is nothing but the actuality of deeds done that may not be undone, of words uttered that may not be recalled. In this world of unrepeatable fact, it is argued,

10 Benedetto Croce, in Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, tr. by B. E. Meyer (London, 1913), I, 212.
history stands out as the record of a unique series of events that has happened once for all. Among the myriad possibilities of a given moment a single choice is made, and the entire future is dominated thereby; among the ways open but one is followed, and this can never be retraced. Recent philosophical discussion lays stress on this view, which is, in fact, the obvious reflection of the narrative method; and the logicians assume that history, with its statements of unique happenings, differs from the sciences, which they describe as concerned only with recurrent uniformities. This distinction reveals the initiatory obstacle to the scientific treatment of "history"—the use of personal names for human beings. Biology also has to reckon with the existence of individuals, but documentary history is the only field of study in which the individual is differentiated from the group by a special nomenclature. The difficulty is incidentally made clear by Professor Bury when, on the one hand, he asserts that the rôle of the individual is the heel of Achilles for historical theory, and, on the other, admits that pre-documentary history lends itself as readily to scientific treatment as zoology.¹¹

Until recently philosophy has asserted that history is not a science; this characterization goes back to Aristotle, and is explicit in European philosophy since the Renaissance. Various opinions are, however, to be observed in the definition of the relations posited between history and philosophy: thus an early view maintained was that as history is not a science it necessarily lies outside of philosophy, whereas the latest is that as history is not a science it is identical with philosophy. Bacon and Hobbes thought that history is properly concerned with individuals, which are circumscribed by time and place, whereas philosophy discards individuals and deals only with abstract

notions. In the nineteenth century the argument shifts so as to bring the antithesis between history and science: thus Schopenhauer asserts that history is not a science because it deals with the particular and individual, whereas the sciences are systems of conceptions; and insists that while the sciences speak of what always is, history knows only "that which is once, and then no more." More recently a common form of the contrast has been that the sciences deal with facts that recur, whereas in history what has once happened is not repeated and can never be reproduced. The antithesis has lent itself to a wealth of expression: Nature deals with the typical in the manifold, History separates the manifold from the typical; Nature is the realm of necessity, History is the realm of freedom; Natural Science systematises and classifies, History individualises and narrates; Natural Science deals with the abstract and conceptual, History with the actual and concrete.

In current discussion the antithesis is based by logicians on the practice of historians during the nineteenth century, and more particularly on the formula of Ranke that the office of the historian is simply to state what it was that happened. While historians, heedless of the outcome, were occupying themselves in describing the succession of such particular events in one country after another as could be detailed from available documents, the logicians were observing their procedure with the object of determining the principles of historical method. Now the crux for logic was that history claimed to be a science, though it did not produce scientific results. In the circumstances there were two ways of escape from the dilemma, and of these one was adopted by English, the other by German logicians. Admitting the claim, English logicians, like Mill and Fowler, looked for a scientific element in historical work; this they found in what

is known as the "comparative method," and hence it comes that, in English logic, "historical" and "comparative," as applied to method, are synonymous terms. In Germany, on the other hand, logicians accepted literally the claim of history to be a science, and, following out this assumption to its conclusion, announced that history constituted a science of a new type.

The argument is simple. It is admitted by Windelband and Rickert that logic follows after method and describes it, and that the method of history differs from that of science. They assume that the practice of historians exhibits the method proper to their subject, and, to justify this view, assume further that the method of a science is determined by the object it has in view. Since, then, the object of history is just the narrative description of unrepeated happenings, it is to be regarded as the science of the particular or individual, in contradistinction to the natural sciences whose object, they say, is the discovery of "laws." 

13 For the literature see Bibliographical Appendix, II, 4.

14 "Sous le pretexte que la logique vient toujours aprés la pratique, enregistre les resultats heureux de l'activite spontanee, ils prennent comme type de la reussite historique les grands historiens du passe. Banke, surtout, est considere comme le maître. Certains declarent que Thucydide ne saurait etre depasse." Henri Berr, "Theoriciens allemands," Revue de synthese historique, 10 (1905), 371.

15 "Windelband had already replaced the old distinction between natural and moral sciences by that between the sciences of events, Ereigniswissenschaften, and sciences of laws, Gesetzwissenschaften, applying the term idiographisch to the method of the former, and nomothetisch to that of the latter (Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft, Strassburger Rectoratsrede, 1894). Xénopol, too, in his Les principes fondamentaux de l'histoire (Paris, 1899), makes a similar division, distinguishing the faits de repetition from the faits de succession. The first suggestion of a division of the kind occurs in Humboldt's Cosmos, but Cournot was the first to determine it clearly and to extend it to all the sciences (Considération sur la marche des idées et des événements dans les temps modernes, Paris, 1872, p. iv). Hermann Paul, who was not acquainted with Cournot's work, draws a distinction in his Principien der Sprachgeschichte (Halle, 1880) between the Gesetzwissenschaften and the Geschichtswissenschaften." Antonio Allotta, The Idealistic Reaction against Science, tr. by Agnes McCaskill (London, 1914), p. 270.

The extended note of Hanns Oertel on pp. 5 and 6 of his Lectures on the Study of Language (New York, 1902) should be read in this connection. It should be observed that the views of this school are based on "the comfortable eighteenth century conception of 'laws of nature.'" Carl Fries points out that "Rickert betont hier nicht genug den Inhalt des Begriffes Gesetz." Archiv für systematische Philosophie 16 (1910), 448 ff.
Now, the admission that "history" is not a science in the recognized meaning of the word is all that need here be taken into consideration. Rickert describes traditional historiography and applies to it the term "scientific." Obviously, then, the question "whether history is capable of scientific treatment" remains precisely where it was before. Scholars who are desirous of placing historical investigation upon a scientific footing will not be deterred by the suggestion that they will no longer be regarded as writers of historiographic literature; nor on the other hand, will they accept the implication that as historiography is the result with which historical students have heretofore been satisfied it therefore represents the only object at which historical inquiry may aim. In short, logic ignores the scientific possibilities of historical inquiry because the historian has not yet found a way to turn to account the opportunities which his materials present.—"Je vous assure," Seignobos stated, "que je ne demanderais pas mieux que d'appliquer en historie des modes de raisonnement analogues à ceux des sciences de la nature; mais vraiment je ne le peux pas."—The thoughtful historian will hesitate to accept the designation "scientific" as applicable to the type of statement embodied in narrative history, for narration has always been and must remain a form or genre of literary art.

The attention of historical students should be called to the fact that although his principal work is described as "eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften," Rickert is a metaphysician, and an exponent of that type of philosophical thought which holds that the fullest revelation of "reality" is to be found in the aesthetic point of view, and which concentrates its critical attention upon the problems of Individuality and Value. It is obvious that a description of Rickert's system of "transcendental idealism" would here be out of place;

16 Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie, 7 (1907), 298.
17 The exposition of Rickert's views on history contained in F. M. Fling's "Historical Synthesis," American Historical Review, 9 (1903), 1-22, omits all reference to the metaphysical background—which is indispensable.
but an indication of the aspect that history wears from this standpoint cannot be omitted.

Philosophy, as we have seen, regards the world, and indeed every particular thing, as a totality, and endeavors to "explain" it; science, on the other hand, acts upon the assumption that all additions to knowledge proceed from the application of the method of dissection—from "the substitution of piecemeal, detailed, and verifiable results for large untested generalities recommended only by a certain appeal to imagination." The philosopher urges that the method of dissection can never return to the concrete individual from which it sets out (thus, for the moment, enlisting a crude realism in his argument) ; the scientist replies simply that any such return is premature until an adequate knowledge of the workings of nature has been obtained. Now, the interest of the philosopher in "history" is that it alone "can fill the gaps left by the formation of scientific concepts, it alone can substitute reality in the fulness of its individual aspects for the empty abstractions of science." "History, in as much as it enables us to watch the realisation of universal values in the world of concrete consciousness, thus becomes the fundamental organ of philosophy." 19


For criticism of Rickert's position see Aliotta, pp. 216-17. Also cf. Bernard Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value (London, 1912), p. 33: "For better or worse, the historical tense, the genuinely personal subject, ... are unknown to the processes of science. A general statement is an extract or an abstract. ... It tells us things about reality; ... It does not pretend to speak of real beings in their whole and fundamental nature. That is to judge categorically in the full sense; to make assertions regarding the nature of the universe as a whole. And this can be done, if at all, by Philosophy alone. For Philosophy is essentially of the concrete and the whole, as science is essentially of the abstract and the part." But "to say that reality can only be found in the given, and not in its expansion and interpretation through thought, is surely the ancient fallacy of naïve Realism" (p. 80).
The nature of the distinction between history and science thus introduced is brought into full light by Urban’s contrast of “appreciative description” and “scientific description”—which, furthermore, serves to make evident the aesthetic leanings of this type of philosophy. History, or, to be more explicit, historiography, is “appreciative description”; as such, it dis-
countenances “scientific description,” and considers the facts provided by investigation “in order to pass judgment on the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic worth of the objects in question in the light of transcendentual ideal standards of value.”

Logic cannot “justify,” its business is to describe, method; and the South-German “value-philosophers” have rendered a service to historical scholarship by revealing, beyond possibility of equivocation, the ineradicable philosophical substratum in all attempts to describe the course of events as they have happened. The effort of the mind in such a case is to grasp the meaning of a whole, and this effort is the characteristic procedure of philosophical thought. Critical inquiry, Merz takes pains to show, “succeeds only in matters of detail; or, where larger prob-
lems are at stake, only by the aid of leading ideas and command-
ing points of view which have themselves outrun criticism, being the spontaneous outcome of the inspired and divining genius. This,” he continues, “has notably been the case in the treatment of larger historical subjects. . . . It is only since the time of Niebuhr, who was followed by Ranke and his school, that Ger-
many has produced historians who have had great influence outside of Germany: this reputation rests not so much and perhaps not mainly upon the critical preparation of the material with which they dealt, as upon the general aspects from which their histories were written.”

22 J. T. Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1912), III, 149–150.
important, that is, it involves a kind of philosophy however crude.'" From the details that investigation provides, the historian "fastens by a certain ideal instinct on those elements which furnish a clue to its meaning, and which enable him to give unity, connexion, relative proportion, harmony and significance to the whole." 23 Thus Benedetto Croce can say that "if a man is to narrate history, he must begin by understanding it, and he can only do this by bringing into consciousness the ideas which lie concealed within it." 24 In short, "there is an implicit philosophy of history in every modern historian, even when he may seem for the time to have no interest beyond the narrative." 25

Lord Acton's pronouncement, "I exhort you never to debase the moral currency or to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try others by the final maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on wrong," 26 may be read in connection with Galloway's remark that "the final presuppositions of history as of ethics are speculative, not scientific." 27

"What the good historian does for a particular period," D. G. Ritchie says, "is to arrive at the meaning, or underlying principle or 'idea' of that period." "The philosophy of history . . . is an attempt to read the plan of Providence, to unravel the plot of the great drama that is played throughout the centuries." 28

". . . and the result is, in one after another of our historians, the sense of something wanting—of a want of 'the one thing needful,' the moral and spiritual life without which history is nothing but an old almanac." 29

"Stubbs believed, and most of us (I think) still believe to-day, that the science which we love is not merely concerned with the stringing together of facts in their correct order and the reconstitution of annals, but with something more. We must draw the moral, whether we will or no: . . . The teacher who contents himself with arraying the facts in due order has only accomplished half his task. He must take the risk

23 John Caird, University Addresses (Glasgow, 1899), pp. 242, 245.
24 Croce, in Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, I, 211.
and endeavour to deduce the inner meaning of the annals that he has set forth, content to err if err he must." \(^\text{30}\)

"For the narrow of civilized history is ethical, not metaphysical, and the deep underlying cause of action passes through the shape of right and wrong . . . In the revolt of the last ten years [written in 1886] against utilitarians and materialists, the growth of ethical knowledge has become, for the first time, the supreme object of history." \(^\text{31}\)

"Research," Eucken says, "does not make the slightest claim to be philosophy; its chief desire is to free history from all philosophical tutelage and make it entirely self-reliant: yet this tendency could not possibly have made such victorious progress and won such whole-hearted devotion unless it both carried in itself and aroused definite convictions." \(^\text{32}\)

"There is no indication in the work, for instance, of Maitland and Vinogradoff that they have been actuated by anything but the purest motives of historical research. Yet it would not be fanciful to attribute the unusual interest in their work to the fact that it was, however indirectly, related to political questions and to modern reconsiderations of the social structure. It had a certain imaginative grasp which the work of many of their fellow-historians has lacked." \(^\text{33}\)

"La philosophie de l'histoire consiste à prendre parmi les doctrines contemporaines une idée saillante quelconque, politique, religieuse ou autre, et à faire de cette idée, ou de sa négation, le pivot d'un récit historique." \(^\text{34}\)

"The historian will fail hopelessly if he seeks to be a mere recorder. For the truth about the whole, the expression of which is what matters, was not realised in its completeness until time and the working of the spirit of the period had enabled the process developed in a succession of particular events to be completed. . . . His business is to select in the light of a larger conception of the truth. He must look at his period as a whole and in the completeness of its development. And this is a task rather of the spirit than of the letter." \(^\text{35}\)

Lest misunderstanding should intrude itself at this point, it may be said that the world is many-sided and that there is room for every form of heedful inquiry. "Philosophy of his-


\(^{33}\) M. H. Gretton, *History* (London [1914]), p. 47.


tory,' which all historical students are brought up to view with suspicion, has its legitimate place, for it must not be forgotten that the desire to find a meaning in life and history is an ineradicable possession of the human spirit. The chaos and fortuitousness of events creates wonderment, and drives men to formulate explanations. There must be some meaning, we feel, in this drama, some end or aim to all this earnestness and striving. The desire for such an interpretation cannot be set aside by arguments to prove the impracticability of its object, for it has its origin in our highest aspirations. As Lotze said: "All human longing to find a guiding thread in the confused variety of history springs from the unselfish desire to recognise a worthy and sacred order in the system and course of the world." So men clinging tenaciously to the idea of a divine Providence which controls at once the immediate happenings of our individual lives and the far-off destiny of the human race. The justification of all such constructions is the need men have for a guiding principle in the conduct of life. Scientific knowledge is incomplete, and these philosophical constructions are temporary working hypotheses for the conduct of life which cannot well be dispensed with.

The constructions of historiography are based upon the philosophico-aesthetic method of "appreciative description"; to make this fact clear it is only necessary to examine the teachings of those who are most urgent in proclaiming that "history is a science."

An important case is that of Principal Caird. In his "Study of History" he begins by showing that, as applied to human actions, individual or collective, the word "science" cannot be employed in accordance with its ordinary usage: "In history," he says, "the phenomena never repeat themselves, and can never be reproduced"; "the facts do not relate to a fixed and abiding order, they cease forever with the single instance of their occurrence, and can never be recalled." He then brings the problem to the form: "In what sense can the term 'science' be applied to the record of the past life of man?", and to find an answer
sets up the further question "Whether philosophy, which claims to be the science of sciences, ... can be accused of presumption when it attempts to introduce the light of reason and intelligible law into the seeming confusion and complication of human history?" The function of a "science" of history would then be, in accordance with Caird's theory, the discovery of "a secret order of reason in the life of nations and of the world" 36—in other words, he proposes that history, in order to become a "science," should adopt the method of philosophy.

Again, Professor Robinson is among those who believe that history has been raised "to the dignity of a science." Having reached this conclusion he finds himself confronted with the problem of the relationship of history to the specialised histories of art, law, religion, and so forth. Is history, as, he says, Seeley maintained, merely a residuum left after these subjects have become independent sciences, and is this residuum destined to be still further reduced by some secession of tomorrow? Robinson's answer might have been drawn from any Introduction to Philosophy. The vital phenomena of human life cannot, he says, be exhausted by any number of monographs on special topics. Man is more than the sum of his scientifically classifiable operations. The whole is something quite distinct from the sum of its parts; "these may be studied, each by itself, with advantage, but specialisation would lead to the most absurd results if there were not some one to study the process as a whole, and that some one is the historian." 37 Thus, it appears, that both in spirit and in aim the "new" history would identify itself with philosophy.

The specialist might appear to be the person best qualified to trace the history of such subjects as mathematics, chemistry, and painting. This, it seems, is a mistake. The specialist, Professor Robinson says, is not trained to "conceive remote and unfamiliar conditions which historically lie back of the conceptions which he entertains," and the historian "is constantly shocked by a certain awkwardness which those inexperienced in historical research are almost sure to betray. They make mistakes which he would not make, in spite of their greater knowledge of the subject with which they are dealing."

36 Caird, as cited, pp. 234, 236, 249, 255.
For a fuller insight into this attitude, which is not exceptional, see the remarks of Professor Edward Channing: "The time comes when the historian must begin to make up his mind. In doing this it is not at all necessary that he should have read every bit of evidence. Take the countless diaries and journals"—descriptive of an historical event—"there are differences between them, no doubt, but in essentials they teach the same truths. These will be patent to the man of historical genius when he has read three or four of them, and will never become visible to him whose mind works in another way, no matter how many he may read." 38

Furthermore, as Professor Bury has given currency to the widely-quoted phrase that "history is a science, no less and no more," it is of some importance to understand that he advocates the philosophical interpretation of history as "the only hypothesis on which the postulate of 'history for its own sake' can be justified as valid." 39 "It is one of the remarkable ideas which first emerged explicitly into consciousness in the last century," he says, "that the unique series of the phenomena of human development is worthy to be studied for itself, without any ulterior purpose, without any obligation to serve ethical or theological, or any practical ends. This principle of 'history for its own sake'," he continues, "might be described as the motto or watchword of the great movement of historical research which has gone on increasing in volume and power since the beginning of the last century. But," he asks—and, in asking, passes over from the attitude of a scientific inquirer to seek the countenance of some exterior authority—"but has this principle a theoretical justification?" "It seems to me," he says, "that our decision of this question must fall out according to the view we take of the relation of man's historical development to the whole of reality. We are brought face to face with a philosophical problem. Our apprehension of history and our reason for studying it must be ultimately determined by the view we entertain of the moles et machina mundi as a whole." 40 So, in bringing his

39 J. B. Bury, "The Place of Modern History in the Perspective of Knowledge," Congress of Arts and Science, St. Louis, 1904, ed. by H. J. Rogers (Boston, 1906), II, 144.
40 Bury, as cited, pp. 143–44.
discussion to a close, he says that "the answer to the question, 'What is the position of modern history in the domain of universal knowledge?' depends in the first instance on our view of the fundamental philosophical question at issue between idealism and naturalism.'

Professor Bury has evidently adopted the philosophical system of his Cambridge colleague, Professor James Ward. "Nothing but a spiritualistic view of the world can, without encountering the difficulty of absolute idealism, afford an intelligible explanation of the unity of nature and thought, and the universal teleology of the 'ought to be,' which the philosophy of values regards as controlling the evolutionary movement of experience. If the universe be not a brute mechanism, but the realm of ends and of history, the outcome of the interweaving of spontaneous individual activities whose goal is the actualisation of the ethical order, only a theistic conception will enable us to comprehend it. The logical completion of the philosophy of values can only be found in a form of spiritualism, and to James Ward belongs the credit of having frankly recognised this fact. Ward, in his Gifford Lectures [Naturalism and Agnosticism (London, 1899), and The Realm of Ends (Cambridge, 1911)] waged a glorious warfare against agnostic naturalism, and sees, like Royce, Münsterberg, and Rickert, in the historical and concrete aspect of the world its true reality as opposed to the abstract, mechanical fictions of science.'

The point of view of this modern school which embraces history in philosophy seems to me to be adequately expressed by George Galloway: "We seem driven to the conclusion that the goal and meaning of history are not to be found in this temporal order of things at all. The facts themselves appear to necessitate the acceptance of some form of transcendency. . . . We are not able to find a meaning in history, viewed as a mundane process in time, which will satisfy the reason and do justice to the moral values involved. That the process is not meaningless we are bound to assume. Accordingly we make the postulate that the ultimate meaning of history must lie in a sphere which transcends the present temporal order.'

This, then, is the end at which the modern historical school, setting out with the resolution to avoid philosophical entanglements, has arrived. The views of Caird, Croce, and Ward, Windelband, Rickert, and Bury, however unpalatable, are based upon the practice of historians—of Thucydides and Ranke, the models

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41 Bury, as cited, p. 152.
42 Aliotta, as cited, p. 265.
of the logicians—and if this practice should prove to be the only form which the results of historical research may take, then historical investigation is, after all, just a study ancillary to philosophy. The subordination of investigation to historiography carries with it the subordination of investigation to philosophical ideas.

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No frequency or emphasis of assertion that "history is a science" can make it such; nor can the verbal repudiation of philosophical ideas exclude these from the historian's statement of his results. The ineradicable philosophical outlook of historiography is perhaps nowhere better displayed than in the idea of "the continuity of history" which has been proclaimed as "the most fundamental and valuable truth which the past has to teach us." To observe the bearings of this idea we may take counsel of the logicians.

The essence of the historical method, Sabine says, "is the conception of historical continuity. Every institution, social or political, every art, science, or religion, in fact, everything which is the product of human activity, as well as every race or nation, has a history and is to be adequately understood only by a study of its genesis and course of development. A nation or institution as it exists at any single period, however self-sufficing it may be, is, so to speak, a cross-section of a long process which extends both into the past and into the future; though itself an individual, it is a member of a larger individual which extends beyond the limits of any single time. Moreover—and this is the real meaning of historical continuity—a series of historical events is a true individual. A mere succession of events in time is by no means adequate to form an historical sequence; a thread of connection, a relating principle, must run through all the particular events and give them a unity in the light of which alone the particular event can have any significance. History deals always with the progress or decadence of a unitary being which persists as an individual in spite of changes; it never deals with a collection of sequent but unrelated events. Unless this were the case, any fact would be of equal importance to the historian with every other fact; selection can take place only with reference to a universal."

44 Robinson, as cited, p. 14.
Now, it is of the first importance that the historical student should distinguish between "continuity" as the basis of an effort to grasp the significance of the course of history as a whole, and a different application of the term, in which it appears simply as a protest against the acceptance of artificial "breaks" in the sequence of events. It may be observed, in passing, that since the time of Leibniz the word "continuity" has been one of those tantalizing counters of thought that pass current though every bargainer has a different notion of what it represents; hence it may be regarded with suspicion when it is introduced into debate without full and sufficient guarantees. Today, it stands for a critical interest both in science and philosophy, and implies different sets of ideas in different fields of thought; there is danger, therefore, that its use in many different connections may convey an unfounded assurance of its validity in yet other associations. The historical student should at least be warned at the outset that "it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the whole logical crux of metaphysics centers in the problem of continuity and discreteness." As Höfdding remarks, "the relation of continuity and discontinuity touches the highest interest of personality as well as of science. In both directions we aim at unity and connectedness; and in this regard the discontinuous appears as an obstacle which has to be overcome. On the other side it is just this discontinuity (difference of time, of degree, of place, of quality, of individuality) which everywhere, in the realm of science as well as of life, brings something new, releases the bound-up forces, and places before us the great tasks."

It is to be observed that the idea of "continuity" derives its significance, in the first place, from the denial it involves of noticeable discontinuities or breaks in nature—for example, Lyell's theory of gradual geological changes as against the older theory of successive cataclysms; Darwin's theory of gradual

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biological changes as against the theory of special creations of living species. Leibniz stated the principle in this negative form: "Nothing," he said, "happens all at once, and it is one of my great maxims . . . that nature never makes leaps." "Everything goes by degrees in nature, and nothing by leaps, and this rule as regards changes is part of my law of continuity." 48 "Telle est cette fameuse loi de continuité, dont Kant a pu dire qu'elle était la plus haute systématisation de l'esprit humain." 49

In history also, the principle of continuity finds its familiar application in the denial of "breaks." Thus it appears that, in the eighteenth century, one of the great obstacles which historical criticism had to overcome was the dogma of the literal interpretation of the Bible. So long as its narrative and events were protected by a veil of sanctity men accepted its statements of supernatural interventions—that is, of discontinuities—in history. Leslie Stephen remarks that Conyers Middleton had "a more distinct view than any of his contemporaries of the essential continuity of history," and that the aim of all his writings was "to remove that veil, and to apply the same methods of enquiry to all periods and all nations, and to show how the supposed breaches of continuity disappeared under closer investigation." 50

In the nineteenth century, historians like Dr. Arnold and Bishop Stubbs held that there was a significant "break" between ancient history and modern. Arnold said: "The state of things now in existence dates its origin from the fall of the western empire; so far we can trace up the fortunes of nations which are still flourishing; history so far is the biography of the living; beyond, it is but the biography of the dead." 51 Stubbs expressed the same idea, saying that Modern History "compared with the study of Ancient History is like the study of life compared with

48 Tr. in Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (Cambridge, 1900), p. 222.
51 Thomas Arnold, Introductory Lectures on Modern History (New York, 1857), p. 42. The extract is from his Inaugural Lecture, 1841.
that of death, the view of the living body compared with that of the skeleton.” “It is Christianity,” he continues, “that gives to the modern world its living unity and at the same time cuts it off from the death of the past.” Ten years later, in 1877, in a lecture “On the Purposes and Methods of Historical Study,” he said: “The false idea, or that which to me seems practically misleading in the term the Unity of History, is the acceptance as a practical rule or maxim that there are no new points of departure in human history; that modern life is a continuation of medieval, of ancient and medieval, history, by a continuity and unity that is at all points equally important, of the same consistency in fact.” This pronouncement came in response to Freeman’s Cambridge lecture in 1872, in which it was maintained against Stubbs that historians “must cast aside all distinctions of ‘ancient’ and ‘modern,’ of ‘dead’ and ‘living,’ and must boldly grapple with the great fact of the unity of history. As man,” he said, “is the same in all ages, the history of man is one in all ages.” The history of mankind must be looked upon as a continuous whole. “No period of history can be clothed with its highest interest and its highest profit, if it be looked at wholly in itself.”


Freeman’s advocacy of ‘continuity in history’ goes back to 1849, when he published the first of three pamphlets—Thoughts on the Study of History—opposing the establishment of a School of Modern History at Oxford. Cf. W. R. W. Stephens, Life and Letters of Edward A. Freeman (London, 1895), I, 117 ff. His essay entitled “The Continuity of English History,” Historical Essays, First Series (London, 1871), was a reprint in part of a review of Robert Vaughan’s Evolutions in English History (London, 1859). In his Inaugural Lecture (1884), he returned to the attack on the position taken by Stubbs: “But I cannot help pointing out, now at the very beginning,” he said, “that this unnatural division into ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ hinders the great central fact of European history, the growth and the abiding of the power of Rome, from being ever set forth in all the fulness of its unity.” “We may well agree to draw a line between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern,’ if we hold our
Freeman's general position is sound; if history is to become a scientific study it cannot pick and choose periods or episodes, but must take into consideration all the facts, not merely such as are subjectively interesting to a given individual. Nevertheless, Freeman failed to live up to the principle of continuity as set forth by himself. It turns out to be European history only that he has in mind; this, he says, "forms one whole in the strictest sense, but between European and Asiatic history the connexion is only occasional and incidental." 54 "While we claim the records of Athenian archons and Roman consuls as essentially parts of the same tale as the records of Venetian doges and English kings, we welcome the recovered records of the Accadian, the Assyrian, and the Hittite, as materials for a high and worthy study, but for a study which is not our own." 55

Almost as Freeman was speaking, however, a younger contemporary at Oxford had advanced to the position that "in the relation of Egypt and Persia to Greece, of Greece to Rome, of Rome to the nations of modern Europe, we see a continuity and a succession which we do not find in the remoter East. They have handed on to one another the lamp of civilization; Egypt, Persia, Greece, and Rome have perished, but each in dying has given life to its successor. China and India neither live nor die." 56 Caird, at the same period, recognized the continuity between the nations of the Nearer East and of Europe, but "outside the pale of civilization" could see only men and races that had "no history any more than herds of cattle." 57

By such steps, in the thirty years that have elapsed since Freeman wrote, has the principle of continuity been extended,

54 Comparative Politics, as cited, p. 215.
55 Methods, as cited, p. 29.
57 John Caird, University Addresses (Glasgow, 1899), pp. 268, 260–61.
until today it covers the "break" between "historical" and "unhistorical" times and peoples. The argument for discontinuity is, however, still maintained, though it no longer turns upon supernatural interventions; it upholds, on a different footing, the view that "history" is restricted to the period for which written documents are available, or, with Professor Bury, distinguishes between a hypothetical "primitive ultra-prehistoric period" in which man was dominated mechanically by his physical environment, and the historical period, in which the problem has become that of the interrelation of human wills.  

Nevertheless, the enlargement of the knowledge of classical antiquity through archaeological discoveries and the comparative study of institutions has actually broken down the "documentary" limitation. The significance of "ancient" history for the present generation lies in the demonstration it provides of the artificiality of the "break" that is founded upon the presence or absence of a particular type of evidential material. The student of the history of ancient Greece finds "documents" everywhere—in potsherds and stones, misunderstood allusions and modern survivals. At this point, moreover, "history" has been brought into immediate and indeed inseparable connection with the work of that great group of scholars—Sir Henry Maine, Sir Charles Lyell, Sir John Lubbock, and Sir Edward Tylor—who, between 1861 and 1865, established the foundations of the "comparative" study of man.

While the principle of continuity was thus enlarging the general scope of history, in its application to the history of individual countries it was proving equally effective. In England, under the influence of the Revolution of 1688, the idea emerged that internal political changes do not destroy the continuity of national existence. In Locke's opinion the Revolution was a reformation within the law, not a breaking of legal bonds.


Again, at the end of the eighteenth century, Burke, stirred by the events in France, expressed the view that societies cannot make a clean break with the past, "for it is by 'the discipline of nature,' as it operates through the centuries, and not by the abrupt initiatives of parties to an explicit contract, that peoples and states are fashioned and perpetuated." 60 Thus was set up the theory of Romantic historiography of "the 'soul of a people' continuously bodied forth in its customs, laws, religion, language, art"; 61 and the influence of the Romantic theory has been to give history a fuller content by gradually extending its purview to include every phase of the social activity of a people.

"'History,'" Professor Firth says, "is not easy to define; but to me it seems to mean the record of the life of societies of men, of the changes which those societies have gone through, of the ideas which have determined the actions of those societies, and of the material conditions which have helped or hindered their development." 62

"'Institutional, economic, social development, these are the subjects that excite the chief interest now,'" 63

"'It is only by tracing the genesis not merely of culminating events but of national institutions, and by exhibiting them as the outcome and embodiment of the genius of the people to whom they belong, that in many cases they can be made intelligible. This principle is the foundation of the historical method.'" 64

"D'ailleurs l'histoire ne se compose pas uniquement, elle ne se compose même pas essentiellement des événements plus ou moins dramatiques que les annalistes et les historiens d'autrefois nous ont racontés; elle

Gefühl für historische Kontinuität. Er suchte die Theorien der englischen parlamentarischen Juristen, die da meinten, sie hätten nicht eine Revolutionsgemacht, sondern dass das alte Recht des Landes behauptet oder wiederhergestellt, in geschichtliche Anschauung umzusetzen."

60 John MacCunn, The Political Philosophy of Burke (London, 1913), p. 52. "The discipline of nature" is that long and gradual process of historical development through which successive generations slowly bring a society into that state of organization in which the varied elements of corporate life all find their appropriate place and function.

61 Fueter, as cited, speaks of Burke as "Der erste grosse Theoretiker der romantischen Präskriptionslehre" (p. 419); and as "Ihr hauptsächlicher Begründer" (p. 421).


63 J. H. Round, "'Historical Research," Nineteenth Century, 44 (1898), 1013.

se compose aussi de tout un ensemble d’institutions, de coutumes et de lois, de manières de vivre, de penser et de sentir, qui constituent la civilisation des diverses époques.\(^65\)

‘L’histoire des grands hommes et des guerres a régné longtemps sans conteste; celle des institutions politiques et sociales lui a succédé, mais elle n’embrasse encore qu’un champ limité de l’activité humaine et si l’on veut arriver à cette reconstruction du passé dont nous parlions au début de ce livre, il ne faut pas s’interdire l’étude des aspects qui sont souvent les plus caractéristiques d’une société.’\(^66\)

‘Wir verstehen somit unter Geschichtswissenschaft die Wissenschaft von den Vorgängen und Veränderungen unter den Menschen. Es müssten folglich alle Betätigungen der Menschen in den Kreis der geschichtlichen Betrachtung gezogen werden.’ ‘Diese Beschränkung des Geschichtsbegriffs auf die Menschen als politische Wesen, . . . die man oft ausgesprochen findet, ist zu eng.’\(^67\)

Thus it appears that the idea of “continuity” as applied to history has proved to be a principle of genuine importance; it has brought us back, after so long a circuit, to the view of Diodorus and the Stoics that “all men living, or who once lived, belong to the common human family though divided from one another by time and space.”\(^68\) It has broken down the barriers that limited “history” to certain political divisions of Europe, and, indeed, to the actions of a restricted number of individuals in these countries. As a result, history today includes not alone every manifestation of political activity among men, but the entire range of human experience.

Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that though the principle of continuity has removed an obstacle in the way of history becoming a science, though it has created an inclusiveness of outlook without which a science of history could not be built up, yet this principle cannot of itself be said to have converted history into a science. After the belief in “breaks” has been abandoned, the conception of history that men derive from the

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further insistence upon the idea of continuity is that of "a series involving an uninterrupted succession of terms," "a representation of a number of objects moving successively before the eye, like the impression obtained by making a voyage along a river, or like a journey through a country." As Molinier remarks: "L'histoire est pour ainsi dire un tissu sans fin, un enchevêtrement de trames compliquées, et toute coupure dans ce vaste ensemble est forcément arbitraire." In brief, the theory of "continuity" represents an adherence to the view which regards history as an unbroken after-one-another succession of events, a single stream of which scholarship is to trace the course, a unique carpet whose unfinished pattern the investigator is to detect upon the loom of Time—the view that brings history into affiliation with philosophy and effectually interposes a barrier to its becoming a science.

The methodological principle accepted generally by historical students in the nineteenth century was expressed in the formula that the aim of the historian is to state what it was that actually took place—in other words, that he should confine himself to the presentation of concrete individual facts. This dictum was not based upon analysis of the problems of historical study, but took form in opposition to the pragmatic utilisation of historical materials. The new policy asserted that the historian should restrict himself to setting down what it was that had happened without permitting himself to introduce moral judgments on the actions recorded or to point lessons for the edification of publicists and statesmen. The soundness of this position may well seem axiomatic, but what seems difficult for historians to realize is that the procedure advocated leaves the actual problems of historiography wholly untouched. As a consequence, "history" still remains identified with narrative, and the function of historical research still continues to be the preparation of materials for the use of the history-writer. The investigator is left to occupy himself with the determination of isolated facts, while the historiographer fits the details into a philosophical framework. If, however, "history" is to become a scientific pursuit, a clear-cut distinction must be made between historiography and historical inquiry. The distinction should occasion no difficulty, but historical inquiry cannot be placed upon a scientific basis so long as it remains dependent upon history-writing and continues to be occupied with the mere determination of individual facts.

What would appear to be a fundamental difficulty in the way of "history" becoming a science is the fact that the word
"history" does not denote a subject-matter. It is true that in ordinary usage a political content is read into the word. This limitation, however, does not accord with the views of contemporary scholars, who take it to include everything that affects civilized man in his social relations; and if an examination be made of the "histories" written since the time of Herodotus a continual shifting of emphasis in their content will be observed. So, while later writers omit the record of meteorological phenomena which are so prominent in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, there has been a notable tendency to enlarge the scope of historical writings by the introduction of details in regard to the literary and artistic achievements of the people concerned. Today, moreover, there is much uncertainty as to what relation should subsist between "History" and the subjects designated "economic history," "military history," "the history of civilisation," and the other special histories of art, literature, religion, philosophy, and science. Each of these fields, apparently, tends more and more to be appropriated by an independent discipline, and so it has been asked whether it only requires that political history should be taken over by Political Science to leave the "historian" without an occupation.

There is, too, another side to the question. The historian, vacillating and uncertain as he may be in regard to the subject-content of "history," has, on the other hand, an absolute confidence in the "historical method." He feels, in short, that he is called upon to emphasise the "historical" aspect—the sequence in time, the after-one-another relation—of happenings, and to show how one particular event has come to follow upon its predecessor. It is evident, indeed, that a scientific value is thought by the historian to attach to the chronological enumeration of events, and it may reasonably be inferred that he holds to the term "history" in preference to adopting a name for his subject-matter because his chief interest lies in the ordered presentation of sequences of happenings. The conception which the historian seeks to maintain is that events have taken place in the past, and that the function of "history" is to state how
these events have followed one another in time. It is, on the other hand, only necessary to examine the products of a century of historical study to see that this method cannot lead to scientific results. The statement that such and such events happened is admittedly the work of the annalist; the historian proper comes in to supply the connecting links, to show how the particular event followed upon its antecedents. The explanation provided is based upon the assumption that every human action has a motive; and each action in history is explained by the interpolation of motives which inferentially led to the particular event.\(^1\) Again, the annalist continues his record indefinitely both as regards time and the nature of the incidents, and his work may be extended without inconsistency by any number of continuators. On the other hand, the historian aims at a unity, and this unity is created either by an emotional realization or a philosophical conception of the significance of a given event or of an extended series of happenings. Clearly, then, "History" is the name, not of a scientific subject, but of a literary form or genre, and as such may be grouped with Poetry and Drama; indeed, one may say that confusion would be avoided if this type of literature were designated "Story"\(^2\)—at least, the question "Is Story Science?" would not then be likely to arise.

It should now be possible to see the question "whether history is capable of scientific treatment" in its proper light. "History"—the statement of an indeterminable number of concrete individual cases—is not, and cannot be converted into a science. If, however, the question be restated in the form: "whether the processes manifested in the concrete instances of history may be investigated in accordance with the method of science?" a wholly different reply may be anticipated. Every object we look out upon, as every idea we entertain, has a history, and the fact that this history is unrecorded in writing does not negative the statement that the object considered has come to be as it is.

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2 *Story* < *storie* < *estoire* < *historia*. Cf. "Story of the Nations" series.
through changes it has undergone in the course of time. This point of view applies equally to the earth and all its physical features, the forms of life upon the globe, and the acquirements of man. Astronomy, Geology, and Biology are historical sciences, and, although they have no written documents upon which to base narratives furnished with names and dates, their efforts to show how the things with which they respectively deal have come to be as they are have been justified by the results obtained. Here, then, the student of the history of man, forced to abandon the non-scientific procedure of attempting to state "just what it was that took place," may find for his guidance a scientific procedure already tested and approved. Looking out upon the world he may see men constituted like himself, but employing different languages, entertaining different ideas, and living under different institutions, and the problem that presents itself is how all these have come to be as we now find them.

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There are many historical sciences, but each of them faces an identical problem. Astronomy and Geology, Biology and the Science of Man, set up the same question and answer it with the same word—"Evolution."

The wide currency of this term in recent years has led to not a little ambiguity in the meaning attached to it. Consequently, "it must be borne in mind," as J. A. Thomson says, "that the general idea of organic evolution—that the present is the child of the past—is in great part just the idea of human history projected upon the natural world." 3 "When applied to the development of conscious and social phenomena." Underhill remarks, "it is very hard to distinguish Evolution from what our forefathers called history." 4 "I take it," Woodbridge says, "that the term 'evolution,' in so far as it indicates

any natural fact, indicates initially no more than the fact that things have a past, that they have a history.’’5 Nevertheless, there is a significant difference in the meaning of the two words, for in all its various uses ‘‘evolution’’ never loses the suggestion of process, and this ‘‘history’’ never gains. The historian states single instances; the evolutionist investigates the processes manifested in any history. ‘‘Evolution’’ and ‘‘history’’ thus deal with the same facts; and, succinctly, the word ‘‘evolution’’ stands for the scientific investigation of what the historian sets down. In the long chain of happenings, the historian undertakes to relate the details of one or another prominent incident that still-existing records enable him to describe; the evolutionist, on the other hand, endeavors to determine what the processes are by which the object before him has come to be as it is. The historian, from the materials at hand, sets himself to create pictures of long-past happenings in the lives of men; the evolutionist looks upon everything around him as having come into existence through the operation of processes which are still going on.

An analogue, seemingly closer than ‘‘history,’’ of the word ‘‘evolution,’’ is the word ‘‘progress.’’ Actually, the modern doctrines of evolution originated in eighteenth-century theories of ‘‘progress,’’ 6 and these theories sprang from the desire of men like Condorcet to discover a meaning in the world around them.7 The words ‘‘evolution’’ and ‘‘progress’’ are, however, by no means equivalent, for the latter definitely connotes betterment and perfectibility. As used in biology, the term ‘‘evolution’’ is practically synonymous with the theory of descent, and means simply that living species of plants and animals are descended from earlier forms and do not owe their origin to special acts of creation. ‘‘Progress,’’ on the other hand, implies a judgment of value; ‘‘it assumes a standard—some end or ends, by relation

5 F. J. E. Woodbridge, ‘‘Evolution,’’ Philosophical Review, 21 (1912), 137.
7 On the history of the idea of ‘‘progress’’ see Jules Delvaille, Essai sur l’histoire de l’idée de progrès (Paris, 1910).
to which we judge historical movements and declare that they mean progress." 8 Quite truly "it imparts to history an intenser meaning," and leads us "to conceive the short development which is behind us and the long development which is before us as coherent parts of a whole"; 9 but this interest in values and ends, this imaginative projection of the course of history—past, present, and to come—which Professor Bury contemplates, is not science, it is philosophy. 10 Indeed, the idea of progress holds a commanding place in the "philosophy of history," 11 and the formulation of a theory of progress is the aim of the branch of philosophy known as Sociology. 12 It should, in addition, be noticed by the historical student, that as the idea of "evolution"...  

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9 Bury, as cited.
10 That Professor Bury is not alone in this respect may be seen from the following remarks of Bishop Creighton: "We search the records of the past of mankind, in order that we may learn wisdom for the present, and hope for the future. . . . We are bound to assume . . . a progress in human affairs. This progress must inevitably be towards some end; and we find it difficult to escape the temptation, while we keep that end in view, of treating certain events as great landmarks on the road. A mode of historical presentation thus comes into fashion based upon an inspiring assumption." Mandell Creighton, "Introductory Note," Cambridge Modern History (New York, 1902), I, 4.
11 "The growth of history towards a scientific stage has been partly the consequence and partly the cause of the growth of certain ideas, without a firm and comprehensive grasp of which no philosophical study or conception of history is possible. . . . One of the most important of the ideas referred to is that of progress. The philosophy of history deals not exclusively but to a great extent with laws of progress, with laws of evolution; and until the idea of progress was firmly and clearly apprehended, little could be done in it." Robert Flint, Historical Philosophy in France (New York, 1894), pp. 87-88.
13 "The study of sociology . . . can hardly justify its existence unless it furnishes us a theory of progress which will enable us to shape the policies of society with a view to future improvement. In other words, the fundamental task of the sociologist is to furnish a theory of social progress." T. N. Carver, Sociology and Social Progress (Boston, 1905), p. 7.
14 "Sociology . . . must offer a theory of progress if it is not to be an abortive affair, but to take its place among the living sciences vitally related to human life and destiny. As a matter of fact, the majority of sociologists from Comte down have made the problem of progress..."
sprang from that of "progress," and represents the attempt to utilize this conception for scientific purposes, where this utilization has not been made complete, "evolution" must remain exposed to the teleological implications which constitute the effective element in the idea of "progress."

Having thus distinguished between the terms "evolution" and "progress," the historical student should discriminate between the scientific application of the idea of evolution and its place in philosophy. Thus constructively—as it is the business of the philosopher to discover the traits common to all phenomena, to find the common law or universal synthesis of things—Herbert Spencer attempted to formulate a universal "law of evolution." 13 On the other hand, Taylor, addressing himself to the criticism of the idea, points out that as "the infinite individual whole of existence has no environment outside itself to supply conditions of development and incentives to change," "the infinite whole evolves neither forward nor backward." 14 It is, for


13 "Si la philosophie a pour champ d'étude le problème métaphysique du progrès cosmique ... la sociologie, pour sa part, ne s'innquiète que du progrès spécifiquement humain. Pour nous, comme pour Comte et Wundt, la philosophie consiste à systématiser le savoir total du genre humain. ... Depuis que, avec Comte, la sociologie s'est affirmée comme une branche particulièrè de la philosophie, son existence se justifie en tant que philosophie de la société et elle ne finira qu'avec la culture elle-même: seul, le dernier homme sur la terre sera le dernier sociologue." Ludwig Stein, "La philosophie du progrès," Annales de l'Institut international de Sociologie, 14 (1912), 484. Barth, as is well known, identifies sociology with Philosophy of History; see his Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie (2. Aufl., Leipzig, 1915).

14 "The aim of Darwin is a theory of species, of Spencer a doctrine of cosmical progress. ... The theory of Darwin accounts for the genesis of natural kinds through adaptation to environment in virtue of natural selection under the conditions of the struggle for existence: Spencer's 'synthetic system' explains the world and life on the basis of 'the continuous redistribution of matter and motion.' ... The Spenceian philosophy ... is so inclusive in its scope that the synthesis undertaken involves from time to time the transcending of the limits of phenomenal inquiry." A. C. Armstrong, Transitional Eras in Thought (New York, 1904), pp. 160–161.

all practical purposes, sufficient for the scientific investigator to comprehend the nature of these discussions, to understand that they lie wholly outside his own field, and to realize that ultimately they turn upon the results of his own labors. Even to take cognizance of them will, however, lead the scientific student to see, more clearly than would otherwise be the case, the bearings of his own efforts; and to understand the importance of distinguishing, in its present instance, between "history," the series of actual concrete happenings; "history" or "historiography," the statement of certain cases regarded as of importance by a given individual writer; and "evolution," "history" viewed as the manifestation of constant processes which it is the work of science to determine and describe.

"Evolution" is the name given to the process-content of any history. Now, a history can only be stated in detail, and that by the chronological enumeration of its particulars, but an evolution, as Darwin showed, may be brought within the scope of scientific method. An idea commonly entertained of Darwin is that he "proved" Evolution. What he actually established—in contradistinction to the old conception that every species was the result of a separate act of creation—was the view that "new" forms of life emerge from the old by an orderly process of which the factors may be isolated and described. It has been said that Darwin projected the idea of human history upon the world of nature, but it was never his purpose to write a "history" fortified with names and dates. He may indeed have seen in the past a vast sequence of particular events; but he accomplished the intellectual liberation of his contemporaries, not by rehearsing the facts of this sequence, but by substituting for the theory of "special creation" a hypothetical statement of the process by which "new" species had their origin. His great contribution to biological science was the hypothesis of Natural Selection, and the investigator of another evolution will turn
with interest to examine the steps by which he arrived at results of such importance in the history of ideas.

In turning to consider Darwin's method, it may be pointed out that such training as he appears to have received before he joined the Beagle was under the direction of men whose attitude, like that of the modern historical scholar, may be described as a devotion to the "fact" in and for itself. The biologists of Darwin's youth recommended their students, as did Cuvier, "to confine themselves solely to the exposition of positive facts without attempting to draw from them inductions." The geologists of the same period "lived under the spell of that strong reaction against speculation which followed the bitter controversy between the Neptunists and Plutonists in the earlier decades of the century. They considered themselves bound to search for facts, not to build up theories."\(^{15}\)

While this was the prevailing attitude towards investigation, it had come to be recognised that the earth and the forms of life upon it had not always been as they are today, and, further, that in the present status of inorganic and organic nature there are discernible evidences of changes which had taken place in the past. It was at the close of the eighteenth century that William Smith established the historical character of geology by his discovery not merely, as had been demonstrated earlier, that the stratified rocks occur in a definite sequence, but that each stratum may be distinguished by the fossils peculiar to itself which it contains. This great discovery "showed that within the crust lie the chronicles of a long history of plant and animal life upon this planet, it supplied the means of arranging the materials for this history in true chronological sequence, and it thus opened out a magnificent vista through a vast series of ages, each marked by its own distinctive types of organic life, which, in proportion to their antiquity, departed more and more from the aspect of the living world."\(^{16}\) Biology, no less than geology, it will be observed, was thus placed upon an historical

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\(^{16}\) Geikie, as cited, p. 169.
footing. Linnaeus, in working out his classification for the systematic description of existing plants and animals, had arranged these in an order from the simplest forms to the most complex. The new science of historical geology, comparing this classification of existing species with the time-order of appearance of species revealed in the rocks, reached the conclusion that the systematic arrangement from simplest to most complex represented an historical sequence from earliest to most recent.

Darwin wrote: "For my part, following out Lyell's metaphor, I look at the natural geological record, as a history of the world imperfectly kept, and written in a changing dialect; of this history we possess the last volume alone, relating only to two or three countries. Of this volume, only here and there a short chapter has been preserved; and of each page, only here and there a few lines. Each word of the slowly-changing language, in which the history is written, being more or less different in the successive chapters, may represent the apparently abruptly changed forms of life, entombed in our consecutive, but widely separated, formations."\(^{17}\)

The principle of comparison thus established in regard to the whole series of life-forms had been recognised earlier in the study of morphology. Buffon had been led by comparison of the structure of different species to observe that animals carry with them internal evidence that they "are no longer what they formerly were." "The pig," he said, "is a compound of other animals; it has evidently useless parts, or rather parts of which it cannot make any use, toes all the bones of which are perfectly formed, and which, nevertheless, are of no service to it."\(^{18}\) So by tracing the structural similarities of closely allied groups, by demonstrating the fundamental likeness of structures used for different purposes, and by pointing out the prevalence of vestigial remains, comparative anatomy had brought to light the existence of evidence in living forms of changes which they had undergone in the past. Similarly, the comparative study of embryology had arrived at the "recapitulation theory," in which

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the striking resemblances between the embryos of higher and the 
adult forms of lower animals were interpreted as evidence that 
the embryos of higher animals recapitulated in their life-history 
the series of ancestral forms through which the species had passed. 

Furthermore, before Darwin’s time, the methodological prin-
ciple through which these different series of historical facts were 
to be brought within the scope of scientific method had been laid 
down by the Scotch geologist James Hutton.19 “With the in-
tuition of genius.” Geikie says, “Hutton early perceived that 
the only solid basis from which to explore what has taken place 
in bygone time is a knowledge of what is taking place today. 
He felt assured that Nature must be consistent and uniform in 
her working, and that only in proportion as her operations at 
the present time are watched and understood will the ancient 
history of the earth become intelligible. Thus, in his hands, the 
investigation of the Present became the key to the interpretation 
of the Past. The establishment of this great truth was the 
first step towards the inauguration of a true science of the 
earth.”20 Hutton started from the point of view that the sur-
face of the globe has not always been as it is today, and based 
his inquiries upon the principle that it has come to be as it is 
through the continued action of the same factors of change that 
are to be observed in operation at the present time; “we are,” 
he said, “to examine the construction of the present earth, in 
order to understand the natural operations of time past.”21 

“But how,” he asks, “shall we describe a process which nobody 
has seen performed, and of which no written history gives any account? 
This is only to be investigated, first, in examining the nature of those 
solid bodies, the history of which we want to know; and 2dly, in ex-
amining the natural operations of the globe, in order to see if there 
now actually exist such operations, as, from the nature of the solid 
 bodies, appear to have been necessary to their formation.”22 

19 Hutton was born in 1726 and died in 1797. His Theory of the 
Earth was read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1785, and was 
20 Geikie, as cited, p. 171. 
21 Hutton, as cited, p. 218. 
22 Hutton, as cited, p. 219.
It is to be observed that Hutton postulated that "Time, which measures everything in our idea, and is often deficient to our schemes, is to nature endless and as nothing"; and adopted the point of view that it was no part of his undertaking to consider "questions as to the origin of things." "By thus placing his theory on a basis of actual observation, and providing in the study of existing operations a guide to the interpretation of those in past times, he rescued the investigation of the history of the earth from the speculations of theologians and cosmologists, and established a place for it among the recognised inductive sciences."  

Hutton's contribution received scant recognition in his lifetime, but after his death it was restated by his friend John Playfair in a work "which for luminous treatment and graceful diction still stands without a rival in English geological literature." From Playfair the mantle of Hutton descended to Sir Charles Lyell, and it was to Lyell that Darwin dedicated the later edition of the Narrative of the Voyage of the Beagle "as an acknowledgement that the chief part of whatever scientific merit this Journal and the other works of the author may possess, has been derived from studying the well-known and admirable Principles of Geology."

It should, therefore, occasion no surprise to find that Darwin's method is simply that of Hutton applied to a new field. With the fact borne in upon him by his South American observations that species become modified, Darwin consciously put aside all

23 Hutton, as cited, p. 215.
24 Geikie, as cited, p. 173.
25 Geikie, as cited, p. 164.
26 Lyell wrote in 1839: "The mottos of my first two volumes were especially selected from Playfair's Huttonian Theory, because although I was brought round slowly, against some of my early prejudices, to adopt Playfair's doctrines to the full extent, I was desirous to acknowledge his and Hutton's priority, and I have a letter of Basil Hall's in which after speaking of points in which Hutton approached nearer to my doctrines than his father, Sir James Hall, he comments on the manner in which my very title-page did homage to the Huttonians, and complimented me for thus disavowing all pretensions to be the originator of the theory of the adequacy of modern causes." Life, Letters, and Journals of Sir Charles Lyell (London, 1881), II, 49.
questions of the origin of life, and addressed himself to the investigation of the changes that are to be observed between successive generations of plants and animals at the present time. "After my return to England," he wrote in his Autobiography, "it appeared to me that by following the example of Lyell in Geology, and by collecting all facts which bore in any way on the variation of animals and plants under domestication and nature, some light might perhaps be thrown on the whole subject." He assumed, as Hutton had done, that Nature was uniform in her ways of working, and that if the factors in the process of change now going on could be discovered they might with confidence be taken as applicable throughout the past. He assumed, in short, that things have come to be as they are through the continuous operation of processes that are now to be observed in nature.

Darwin found it impracticable to observe changes among animals living under natural conditions, and hence his investigations were largely concerned with "domesticated productions." He soon perceived that the keystone of man's success in making useful races of animals and plants was the selection exercised in breeding, that without the intelligent interference of the breeder there would be no new race. The problem then presented itself, and remained for some time a mystery to him, how selection could be applied to organisms living in a state of nature—in Weismann's words, "how what was purposive could conceivably be brought about without the intervention of a directing power." The next step he thus describes: "In October, 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened to read for amusement 'Malthus on Population,' and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of

this would be the formation of new species. Here then I had at last got a theory by which to work."

"The Darwinian hypothesis," Huxley said, "has the merit of being eminently simple and comprehensible in principle, and its essential positions may be stated in a very few words: all species have been produced by the development of varieties from common stocks, by the conversion of these first into permanent races and then into new species, by the process of natural selection, which process is essentially identical with that artificial selection by which man has originated the races of domestic animals—the struggle for existence taking the place of man, and exerting, in the case of natural selection, that selective action which he performs in artificial selection." In Darwin's statement: "As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected. From the strong principle of inheritance, any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form."

For the present purpose it is unnecessary to proceed with an analysis of Darwin's hypothesis or to follow the debates to which it has given rise. Here it is his method only that is of moment. The problem that he set for himself was to discover how "new" species arise; and the hypothetical element in his description of this process was the rôle he assigned to "the struggle for existence." He began, as we have seen, by attempt-

28 Life and Letters, as cited, I, 68.
30 Darwin, as cited, p. 16.
31 See V. L. Kellogg, Darwinism To-day (New York, 1907).
32 "'The only element of theory in his doctrine of evolution by natural selection has reference to the degree in which these observable facts, when thus brought together, are adequate to account for the process of evolution.' G. J. Romanes, Darwin and after Darwin, I (Chicago, 1892), p. 264. "'The characteristic feature in which Natural Selection differs from every other attempt to solve the problem of evolution is the account taken of the struggle for existence, and the rôle assigned to it.' E. B. Poulton, Charles Darwin and The Origin of Species (London, 1909), p. 8.
ing to determine the factors of change which are to be observed at the present time; he investigated change in the Present on the methodological assumption that the processes which had been in operation throughout the Past were still active; and, having arrived at his hypothesis, he applied it to the Past on the further assumption that "Time is to nature endless and as nothing."

The outcome of Darwin's work, in his own eyes, was the demonstration of "how things had come to be as they are." "It is interesting," he says in conclusion, "to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction; Variability from the indirect and direct action of the external conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows." 33

The investigator in another field who proposes to follow the method of Hutton and Darwin must be prepared to conduct his investigations with complete independence of spirit. Every science must formulate its own hypotheses in its own terminology on the basis of its own material.

"Each science is but an aspect of the whole, a pictured facet of Nature's unity, but it has its own categories, its own values. No one of the main sciences . . . is intelligibly reducible into the concepts of

33 Darwin, as cited, p. 413.
any other, those of mechanics, physics, chemistry, despite their long exaggerated pretensions, as little as any. . . . So then for biology. Its theory of life, of evolution must be in its own terms, of function and form, and free therefore from absorption into the lower physical order, as from exaggeration into the higher ethical and political one.  

This necessity is the more to be noted since the stimulus to thought, and the impetus to biological inquiry occasioned by Darwin’s hypothesis have tempted some theorists to assume that Natural Selection is a universal formula applicable to every evolution. Thus J. M. Baldwin says: “The theory of natural selection is to be accepted not merely as a law of biology as such, but as a principle of the natural world, which finds appropriate application in all the sciences of life and mind.” Now the particular evolution investigated by Darwin was that of the physical forms of animal species; whereas the evolution to be considered by the student of “history” is fundamentally intellectual and involves the purposive activities of men. Consequently, even if biologists had not arrived at the conclusion that “Natural Selection has long since ceased to be the dominant factor in human progress,” it might properly be inferred that the terms descriptive of the one would not be applicable to the other. There is a special reason, however, why the student of “history” should be on his guard against adopting the terminology of Darwin’s theory. The nearly identical hypotheses


35 Darwin and the Humanities (Baltimore, 1909), p. 80. To reach this conclusion, Professor Baldwin defines “the principle of selection as Darwin conceived it,” not in Darwin’s words, but as “the principle of survival from varied cases” (p. viii); it is, however, just the specific biological content of the theory, which this re-formulation so carefully excludes, that gives the theory its working value.

36 Lloyd Morgan, in Darwin and Modern Science, ed. by A. C. Seward (Cambridge, 1909), p. 445. “The mental qualities which have developed in Man, though traceable in a vague and rudimentary condition in some of his animal associates, are of such an unprecedented power and so far dominate everything else in his activities as a living organism, that they have to a very large extent, if not entirely, cut him off from the general operation of that process of Natural Selection and survival of the fittest which up to their appearance had been the law of the living world.” Sir E. R. Lankester, The Kingdom of Man (London, 1907), p. 25. Cf. Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (New York, 1871), I, 161–177: “Natural Selection as affecting Civilized Nations.”
of Darwin and Wallace were both suggested by reading Malthus, which was itself an "historical" study; the two hypotheses were derived, broadly speaking, from observation of English society in the earlier part of the nineteenth century; and the terms—"struggle for existence," "survival of the fittest," "natural selection"—used by Darwin to designate the factors of organic evolution were metaphorical expressions suggested by human experience. So "behind these fatal phrases, which have become almost household words, lurk many dangers for the unwary." 38

The student of the evolution represented in the facts of human history must, therefore, be prepared to take upon himself the burden of an independent investigation; he cannot hope to adopt ready-made the formulae which have proved useful in other subjects; and he will turn to Darwin simply to observe the method which he employed.

Again, before accepting Darwin's mode of approach to his subject, it is of the utmost importance that the investigator in another field should take account of certain fundamental objections that have been urged against the theories of Lyell and Darwin.

Hutton, as has been already mentioned, assumed, that "Time is to nature endless and as nothing." Building upon this foundation, Lyell postulated, not only that all the changes in the earth's surface have been due to operations similar to those still going on around us, but that these "have never acted with different degrees of energy from that which they now exert." 39

In other words, he advocated the view that things have come

37 "There has prevailed in the main, and still prevails, a naïve forgetfulness of the social origins of these naturalists' discoveries." Geddes and Thomson, as cited, p. 214. For Wallace's account of his discovery of the theory of natural selection, see his autobiography, My Life (New York, 1905), I, 361–62.

38 Darwin himself recognised this criticism: "Every one knows," he said, "what is meant and is implied by such metaphorical expressions; and they are almost necessary for brevity." Origin of Species, as cited, p. 79. The difficulty, which presents itself even in biology, is, however, greatly increased when these words, freighted with new meanings, are carried back again into the discussion of social problems.

to be as they are by a process of continuous slow modification through unlimited time. Neither in Lyell's day nor subsequently has this view passed unchallenged; and there has been a pronounced disposition among later geologists to insist that the known agencies of geological change have operated with varying degrees of intensity in different periods. Indeed, that some modification of 'uniformitarianism' is necessary seems to follow from the growing realisation that the life-history of the earth, however indefinitely extended it may appear to human reckoning, falls, nevertheless, within a limited period of time.40

Darwin, it must be clearly understood, accepted Lyell's view, and held that 'as natural selection acts solely by accumulating slight, successive, favourable variations, it can produce no great or sudden modification; it can act only by very short and slow steps. Hence the canon of 'natura non facit saltum.'"41 He says further: 'I am well aware that this doctrine of natural selection, ... is open to the same objections which were at first urged against Sir Charles Lyell's noble views on 'the modern changes of the earth, as illustrative of geology'; but we now seldom hear the action, for instance, of the coast-waves, called a trifling and insignificant cause, when applied to the excavation of gigantic valleys or to the formation of the longest lines of inland cliffs. Natural selection can act only by the preservation and accumulation of small inherited modifications, each profitable to the preserved being; and as modern geology has almost banished such views as the excavation of a great valley by a single diluvial wave, so will natural selection, if it be a true principle, banish the belief of the continued creation of new organic beings, or of any great and sudden modification in their structure.'42 That is, natural selection will alter a specific type slowly and continuously in adaptation to a gradually changing environment.43 Darwin's theory is thus literally an addendum

41 Darwin, as cited, p. 397; cf. p. 179.
42 Darwin, as cited, p. 91.
43 Romanes, as cited, pp. 260-61.
to that of Lyell; but if "it is characteristic of a species that it always exhibits a constant relation to a particular environment."\textsuperscript{44} and if, as Darwin asserted, "scarcely any palaeontological discovery is more striking than the fact that the forms of life change almost simultaneously throughout the world," it would follow from the admission of accelerated geological changes that far-reaching changes of environment may at times have led to species-modifications which were not "insensibly fine gradations."\textsuperscript{45}

It is of interest to note that Wallace's theory was also based upon that of Lyell. "Along with Malthus," he says, "I had read, and been even more deeply impressed by, Sir Charles Lyell's immortal Principles of Geology; which had taught me that the inorganic world—the whole surface of the earth, its seas and lands, its mountains and valleys, its rivers and lakes, and every detail of its climatic conditions—were and always had been in a continual state of slow modification. Hence it became obvious that the forms of life must have become continually adjusted to these changed conditions in order to survive. The succession of fossil remains throughout the whole geological series of rocks is the record of the change; and it became easy to see that the extreme slowness of these changes was such as to allow ample opportunity for the continuous automatic adjustment of the organic to the inorganic world, as well as of each organism to every other organism in the same area, by the simple process of 'variation and survival of the fittest.' Thus was the fundamental idea of the 'origin of species' logically formulated from the consideration of a series of well ascertained facts."\textsuperscript{46}

From the point of view of method, it is to be regretted that Lyell had not read Hutton with greater care, for the latter distinctly points out—what Lyell does not seem to have fully recognised and Darwin completely ignored—that the postulate of uniformity or gradual modification is a methodological assumption set up for the convenience of the investigator. "We have."

\textsuperscript{44} Georg Klebs, in Darwin and Modern Science, as cited, p. 227.

\textsuperscript{45} "Huxley, in his early correspondence upon the Origin of Species, tried to convince Darwin of the possibility of occasional rapid leaps or changes in Nature, analogous to those which St. Hilaire had advocated, ... Darwin held to his original proposition, handed down from Leibnitz: 'Natura non facit saltum'," H. F. Osborn, From the Greeks to Darwin (2d ed., New York, 1905), p. 238.

\textsuperscript{46} A. R. Wallace, quoted in J. W. Judd, The Coming of Evolution (Cambridge, 1910), p. 79.
Hutton says, "been representing the system of this earth as proceeding with a certain regularity, which is not perhaps in nature, but which is necessary for our clear conception of the system of nature. The system of nature is certainly in rule, although we may not know every circumstance of its regulation. We are under a necessity, therefore, of making regular suppositions [i.e., suppositions of regularity], in order to come at certain conclusions which may be compared with the present state of things." "We are not," he says emphatically, "to limit nature with the uniformity of an equable progression, although it be necessary in our computations to proceed upon equalities." 47 The postulate of continuous slow modification was, therefore, regarded by Hutton as a methodological assumption necessary in the earlier stages of scientific inquiry, but as one which was not to be permitted to interpose an obstacle to further investigation. "Thus also," he remarks, "in the use of means, we are not to prescribe to nature those alone which we think suitable for the purpose, in our narrow view. It is our business to learn of nature (that is by observation) the ways and means, which in her wisdom are adopted; and we are to imagine these only in order to find means for further information, and to increase our knowledge from the examination of things which actually have been." 48

In toiling upward the human mind progresses by making stretches, now to one side of the ascent, and now to the other. So Lyell explained: "I did not lay it down as an axiom that there cannot have been a succession of paroxysms and crises, on which 'à priori reasoning' I was accused of proceeding, but . . . I complained that in attempting to explain geological phenomena, the bias has always been on the wrong side; there has always been a disposition to reason à priori on the extraordinary violence and suddenness of changes, both in the inorganic crust of the earth, and in organic types, instead of attempting strenuously to frame theories in accordance with the ordinary opera-

47 Hutton, as cited, pp. 301-302.
48 Hutton, as cited, p. 302.
tions of nature.’’ 49 Lyell accomplished important results by holding tenaciously to this methodological standpoint, from which, however, the succeeding generation of geologists diverged much as he had done from the view taken by his predecessors. ‘‘While, therefore,’’ Geikie says, ‘‘the geological doctrine that the present order of Nature must be our guide to the interpretation of the past remained as true and as fruitful as ever, it had now to be widened by the reception of evidence furnished by a study of the earth as a planetary body.’’ 50 Similarly, biologists taking up the study of organic evolution where Darwin left it, have also declined ‘‘to limit nature with the uniformity of an equable progression,’’ and have found it necessary to supplement ‘‘the ordinary operations of nature’’ by taking into consideration the course of change upon the face of the earth.

‘‘All known facts appear to suggest that the processes of evolution have not operated in a gradual and uniform manner.’’ 51

‘‘The condition of the earth’s surface or, at least, of large portions of it, has for long periods remained substantially the same; this would involve a greater degree of fixity in the organisms which have existed during such periods of little change than in those which have come into being during periods of more rapid transition; for, though rejecting catastrophes as the general modus agendi of nature, I am far from saying that the march of physical changes has been always perfectly uniform.’’ 52

‘‘... These considerations lead me to express a doubt whether biologists have been correct in looking for continuous transformation of species. Judging by analogy we should rather expect to find slight continuous changes occurring during a long period of time, followed by a somewhat sudden transformation into a new species, or by rapid extinction.’’ 53

‘‘The terrestrial plant is inseparably dependent on the conditions, not only of the soil and the water, but also of the air from which it derives an important part of its substance. Any change, therefore, in the climatic, terrestrial, or water conditions of its environment directly

49 Life ... of Sir Charles Lyell, as cited, II, 3.
50 Geikie, Landscape in History, as cited, p. 177.
53 Sir George Darwin, ‘‘President’s Address,’’ British Association, Report of the 75th Meeting, 1905, p. 8.
affects the plant and causes morphologic changes to a greater or less degree, the greater plant variations corresponding usually to the greater environmental changes. The great floral revolutions of geologic history are connected with the great diastrophic movements.”

We are here, evidently, at a point of some importance for evolutionary study. The “modern changes” which Lyell and Darwin set up are inadequate as a statement of the processes manifested in the evolution of the earth and the forms of life upon it. Bateson is simply re-echoing the words of the geologists when he says that “we see no changes in progress around us in the contemporary world which we can imagine likely to culminate in the evolution of forms distinct in the larger sense.”

Clearly, then, the question arises whether the method we have been examining is inherently sound, or whether there has been some failure in the application of it.

The difficulty, it seems to me, lies in a too instant concentration of attention upon the element of “change.” “We overlook and half forget the constant while we see and watch the variable.” The business of science is to discover the processes manifested in nature; and “we should not forget that the theory of evolution does not postulate that a change must take place in the course of time, but only that it may take place sometimes.”

“We are all accustomed,” Huxley remarked, “to speak of the number and the extent of the changes in the living population of the globe during geological time as something enormous; but looking only at the positive data furnished by the fossil world from a broader point of view . . . a surprise of another kind dawns upon the mind; and under this aspect the smallness of the total change becomes as astonishing as was its greatness under the other.” “Any admissible hypothesis of progressive modification.” he concludes, “must be compatible with persist-

54 David White, in Outlines of Geologic History, ed. by R. D. Salisbury (Chicago, 1910), p. 139.
57 T. H. Morgan, Evolution and Adaptation (New York, 1903), p. 44.
ence without progression, through indefinite periods.” 58 It is, in fact, this remarkable characteristic, which Huxley calls “per-
sistence,” that makes evolutionary study possible, since it has
preserved for us indications of the modifications through which
the earth, life-forms, and human ideas and associations have
passed.

It is open to question, therefore, whether the investigation
of an evolution might not profitably begin with an attempt to
determine the processes which restrict change and promote sta-
bility. Bearing in mind that change is discernible only against
a background of the unchanging, one might suggest that it was
the status of thought in Darwin’s time that led him to place
“change” in the forefront of his inquiry. No man, whatever
his intellectual endowment, is independent of the surroundings
in which he lives, and the belief in the fixity of species current
in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, determined that
Darwin’s theory of species-formation should be secondary and
contributory to his theory of descent. 59 In Darwin’s argument,
the fact of “persistence” or restriction of change receives recog-
nition, but he explains it merely by saying that in such cases
no beneficial variations had arisen. “On my theory,” he re-
marks, “the present existence of lowly organised productions
offers no difficulty; for natural selection includes no necessary
and universal law of advancement or development—it only takes
advantage of such variations as arise and are beneficial to each
creature under its complex relations of life.” 60 In recent bio-
logical literature there are indications that this explanation is
felt to be unsatisfactory, and the question has been raised
“whether the object of our search ought not, instead of the cause
of variation, to be the cause of similarity”; but, as far as I am
aware, this alternative mode of approach has not been employed
in dealing with the main problem of evolutionary investigation.

59 “Descent with modification” he speaks of as “my theory.” Cf.
60 Darwin, as cited, p. 119.
"*The fundamental idea in the theory of Natural Selection is the persistence of those types of life which are adapted to their surrounding conditions.*" "The study of stability and instability furnishes the problems which the physicist and biologist alike attempt to solve." "*Stability is a property of relationship to surrounding conditions.*" 61

"It is probable that variability is, like growth, a primary quality of living things, and that 'breeding true' has arisen secondarily as a restriction." 62

"In short, it is evident that the progress of the backboned land animals during the successive periods of geological time has not been uniform and gradual, but has proceeded in a rhythmic manner. There have been alternations of restless periods which meant real advance, with periods of comparative stability, during which the predominant animals merely varied in response to their surroundings, or degenerated, or gradually grew to a large size." 63

"*The problem that confronts the evolutionist is the nature of the mechanism which rendered possible the persistence of a certain compound or of certain compounds possessing that particular constitution conferring upon them that stable instability known as life.*" 64

"Quand je parle de la stabilité d'une espèce vivante, je pense à la stabilité du patrimoine héréditaire de cette espèce. Ce patrimoine héréditaire définit complètement l'espèce, et l'espèce ne peut être définie que par lui.... Quand je parle de la stabilité du patrimoine spécifique, je fais allusion au fait que ce patrimoine a une tendance à se conserver à travers les vicissitudes de la vie.... Il est donc bien évident que l'hérédité, comme l'assimilation, conservent le patrimoine spécifique. Si cette conservation était parfaite, il n'y aurait pas d'évolution.... En réalité, cette stabilité, bien que remarquable, n'est pas absolue; quand les conditions changent, il y a lutte. Les individus vaincus par le milieu disparaissent; ceux qui triomphent se conservent, mais ils ne triomphent pas totalement; ils subissent une défaité partielle qui est l'adaptation.... "*La loi de stabilité progressive dont je m'occupe actuellement peut s'énoncer ainsi: Quand, sous l'influence d'une adaptation prolongée à des conditions nouvelles d'existence, le patrimoine héréditaire d'une lignée subit une variation qualitative, il passe, d'un état stable, à un état plus stable que le précédent." 65

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The case, as affecting man, may be stated thus: if, in considering the evolution of humanity, we allow our attention to be engrossed by the details of documentary history, by "history" as it is written, by the conditions of life under which we ourselves are living, then, obviously, "change" will appear as the very essence of things. So, when we say "that the general idea of organic evolution is in great part just the idea of human history projected upon the natural world," we are applying in biology a concept derived from an undue preoccupation with what is, after all, but a fraction of human history; and are ignoring, like all historians, the less mobile parts as "unhistorical" and negligible. If, on the other hand, we endeavor to take a broader view of human life, the element of "change" loses its preponderance, and that of "fixity"—to use Bagehot's word—of backwardness or barbarism, comes into prominence; for the vast majority of mankind, in the past as in the present, has been and still is relatively immobile. In the special case of human evolution, at least, the element of "fixity" may well become the fundamental problem of inquiry; and if we assume with the anthropologists that the mind of man is everywhere the same, it will be seen that the stationary character of backward and barbarous peoples is due to the presence of continuously operative restraints, while, on the other hand, advancement follows upon the loosening of these restrictions at a given moment of time—"most of the peoples who have played a great part in history, have as a matter of fact started their 'historical' period with something of a crisis, and period of rapid change." 66

"In spite of overwhelming evidence, it is most difficult for a citizen of Western Europe to bring thoroughly home to himself the truth that the civilisation which surrounds him is a rare exception in the history of the world." 67 "The truth is that the stable part of our mental, moral, and physical constitution is the largest part of it, and the resistance it opposes to change is such that, though the variations of human society in a portion of the world are plain enough, they are neither so rapid nor so extensive that their amount, character, and general direction cannot be ascertained." 67

“Our habitual instructors, our ordinary conversation, our inevitable and ineradicable prejudices tend to make us think that ‘Progress’ is the normal fact in human society, the fact which we should expect to see, the fact which we should be surprised if we did not see.”… “But, in fact, any progress is extremely rare. As a rule… a stationary state is by far the most frequent condition of man, as far as history describes that condition; the progressive state is only a rare and an occasional exception.” “This principle will, I think, help us in trying to solve the question why so few nations have progressed, though to us progress seems so natural—what is the cause or set of causes which have prevented that progress in the vast majority of cases, and produced it in the feeble minority.”

“Darwin, we have, seen, accepted Lyell’s theory of ‘gradual modification,’ and ignored Hutton’s warning that this assumption of regularity is to be regarded solely as a convenience in research. This does not mean that Hutton asserted, and Darwin denied, arbitrary interpositions in the natural order of things; on the contrary, the Scotch geologist held to the opinion that ‘the system of nature is certainly in rule’—but he recognised that this ‘rule’ is not confined to the one strand or element which the scientist may have taken as the object of his inquiry.

68 Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics [1869] (New York, 1912), pp. 41, 211, 206.
70 Henry Balfour, Presidential Address, (Section H, Anthropology), British Association, Report of the 74th Meeting, 1904, p. 697.
71 Bateson, as cited, pp. 19, 29.
For the purposes of research phenomena must be isolated, but the investigator must not be betrayed into imagining that this isolation ever occurs under actual conditions. Every "change" is an "event," but it is not on that account to be regarded as an "accident." To the individual ignorant of the conception of natural process, everything must appear "accidental"; to the scientist, however, "accident" is natural process out of focus for a particular investigator at a given time. So, while "the system of nature is certainly in rule," it admits of changes taking place, and "change in one part of the universe involves a change throughout. No part lives unto itself, but all are members one of another."

It is apparent, then, that there are two ways by which the study of an evolution may be approached—we may begin with the isolation and description either of the processes manifested in "change," or of those manifested in "fixity." In adopting the first course, the assumption of "uniformity" requires the further assumption, made by Lyell and Darwin, of unlimited time for the operation of "gradual modifications"; in adopting the second, we must follow the historical record in order to observe the actual course of change. In the first instance, evolution is thought of as a flowing stream of change continuously moving forward in a direction from lowest to highest; in the second, it is conceived as a series of experiments in adjustment or adaptation,72 broken in upon, from time to time, by conflicting experiments of the same sort. The mode of thought induced by the first approach tends to a forgetfulness of the essential fact that in nature no process appears in isolation; the point of view of the second demands a constant vigilance in regard to changes occurring outside the field immediately under investigation.

It must not be thought that this alternative mode of approaching the study of evolution is brought forward as a contribution

---72C. B. Davenport, Congress of Arts and Science, St. Louis, 1904 (Boston, 1906), V, 250, says: "Only within the last few years have we come to recognize that every organ is more than a homologue: it is also a successful experiment with the environment."
to astronomical, geological, or biological theory, or as applicable to any evolution but that of man. It is introduced here merely to emphasize to students of human evolution, first, that the objections urged against Darwin’s theory of natural selection may possibly be a result of his too ready acceptance of Lyell’s authority; and, second, that Darwin’s procedure in taking “change” as the immediate subject of inquiry is not necessarily the only course open to them. Nor should this conclusion be taken as an argument against Hutton’s principle that the Present is the key to the Past, although it does point to a modification of the procedure to be followed. The Present that lies before us is not even mainly “new,” but consists for the greater part of things carried over from the Past. Hence, in attempting to discover “how things have come to be as they are,” it is possible that the processes first to be investigated should be those manifested everywhere in repression and fixity, while in the second place would follow inquiry into the processes made visible in temporary “releases” from the restrictions of habit, custom, and accepted ideas.

“The system of nature is certainly in rule,” but “we are not to limit nature with the uniformity of an equable progression.” The inquiry into present or “modern” processes of evolution was recognized by Hutton as an expedient in the earlier stages of investigation. Darwin saw clearly that the test of his theory lay in its applicability to the past. “He who rejects these views on the nature of the geological record.” he remarked, “will rightly reject my whole theory.” We may study the present in order to throw light upon the past, and we may begin by isolating what appear to be the existing processes, but, for verification, any evolutionary hypothesis must be shown to agree with what we know to have taken place in the course of time. The truth is that the discovery of a valid hypothesis necessitates an equal consideration of all the evidence. For any evolution, this is tripartite, consisting of (1) the existing series as arranged in order from lowest to highest;

73 Darwin, as cited, p. 297.
Teggart: Prolegomena to History

(2) the ontogenetic series, represented in individual development; and (3) the historical or palaeontological series. A hypothesis to be satisfactory must fit each of these classes of facts, and hence a hypothesis to be satisfactory must be based upon the comparison of the different series of facts regarded as manifestations of the same processes. When, however, the problem is stated in this way, it at once becomes apparent that the method of investigation to be followed in the broad subjects of organic and human evolution is just the application to a more extended content of that "Comparative Method" which has proved its efficiency in a wide range of special fields.

5

In discussing the attitude of Logic towards History it was stated that English logicians, like Mill and Fowler, looking for a scientific element in historical work, found this in what is known as the "comparative method," and that subsequently in English logic, "historical" and "comparative," as applied to method, are synonymous terms. This statement may now be illustrated.

"What is called the historical or comparative method," one of the latest representatives of this school says, "has in the last few generations revolutionized many branches of enquiry. It is but an application of the general principle of varying the circumstances in order the better to discover the cause of a phenomenon. But of old, enquirers into matters of historical growth, such as language, or myth, or religion, or legal ideas, were content to attempt an explanation of the facts of some particular age or country by observations carried on within that age or country alone, or if beyond it, only in adjacent ages or countries of the same type. The historic method looks farther afield. It compares the institutions of widely different ages, or of peoples who though contemporaneous stand at widely different levels of civilization and of thought. In the light of such a comparison, facts may take on quite a new appearance. Legal or other customs for which a later age had found a reason in some supposed meaning or utility which they now possessed are seen to have had a very different origin, in conditions no longer existing, and ideas no longer entertained. Folk-lore is full of
such surprises. . . . It is the same with myth; . . . Therefore it is important to insist upon studying the present in the light of history and comparing as extensive a range of facts as can be gathered together." 74

That this description may be taken to represent the view of scholars who make use of the comparative method is to be seen from the following:

"I think I may venture to affirm," Sir Henry Maine says, "that the Comparative Method, which has already been fruitful of such wonderful results, is not distinguishable in some of its applications from the Historical Method. We take a number of contemporary facts, ideas, and customs, and we infer the past form of those facts, ideas, and customs not only from historical records of that past form, but from examples of it which have not yet died out of the world, and are still to be found in it. When in truth . . . we gain something like an adequate idea of the vastness and variety of the phenomena of human society; when in particular we have learned not to exclude from our view of earth and man those great and unexplored regions which we vaguely term the East, we find it to be not wholly a conceit or a paradox to say that the distinction between the Present and the Past disappears. Sometimes the Past is the Present; much more often it is removed from it by varying distances, which, however, cannot be estimated or expressed chronologically. Direct observation comes thus to the aid of historical enquiry, and historical enquiry to the help of direct observation." 75

"Our system," Andrew Lang said, "is but one aspect of the theory of evolution, or is but the application of that theory to the topic of mythology. The archaeologist studies human life in its material remains; he tracks progress (and occasional degeneration) from the rudely chipped flints in the ancient gravel beds, to the polished stone weapon, and thence to the ages of bronze and iron. He is guided by material 'survivals'—ancient arms, implements, and ornaments. The student of Institutions has a similar method. He finds his relics of the uncivilised past in agricultural usages, in archaic methods of allotment of land, in odd marriage customs, things rudimentary—fossil relics, as it were, of an early social and political condition. The archaeologist and the student of Institutions compare these relics, material or customary, with the weapons, pottery, implements, or again with the habitual law and usage of existing savage or barbaric races, and demonstrate that our weapons and tools, and our laws and manners, have been slowly evolved out of lower conditions, even out of savage conditions. The anthropological method in mythology is the same. . . ." 76

75 Village-Communities in the East and West (London, 1871), pp. 6-7.
"The study might accordingly be described as the embryology of human thought and institutions, or, to be more precise, as that enquiry which seeks to ascertain, first, the beliefs and customs of savages, and, second, the relics of these beliefs and customs which have survived like fossils among peoples of higher culture." 77

"The beliefs, customs, and institutions of tribes in a low degree of civilisation are our only clue to those of a more archaic condition no longer extant. They are evolved from them, and are in the last resort the outgrowth of ideas which underlay them. When, therefore, we find a belief, a custom, or an institution—still more when we find a connected series of beliefs, customs, and institutions—overspreading the lower culture we may reasonably infer its roots in ideas common to mankind and native to the primitive ancestral soil. The inference is greatly strengthened if vestigial forms are also found embedded in the culture of the higher races. It is raised to a certainty if unambiguous expression of the ideas themselves can be discovered to-day among the lower races. The advance of even the most backward from primeval savagery has been so great that a large harvest of these ideas is not to be expected. . . . 78

It is evident that the method here described is made possible by the fact—which is characteristic of our world—that the Past lives on into the Present. ""When in the process of time,"" Tylor says, ""there has come general change in the condition of a people, it is usual, notwithstanding, to find much that manifestly had not its origin in the new state of things, but has simply lasted on into it."" 79 M'Lennan was of opinion that ""the variety of the forms of life—of domestic and civil institution—is ascribable mainly to the unequal development of the different sections of mankind."" ""The species has been so unequally developed that almost every phase of progress may be studied as a thing somewhere observed and recorded."" 80 That is, the type of evidence available for the study of human evolution is identical with that utilized in geology and biology.

Now, broadly speaking, it may be said that the present situation of the studies relating to Man is similar to that of the

biological sciences when Darwin began his work. At that time, as has been pointed out, subjects like palaeontology, comparative anatomy, and comparative embryology had already been brought to a high state of elaboration; while, on the other hand, general theories of evolution were entertained, and attempts, notably that of Lamarck, had even been made to formulate scientific hypotheses in regard to the evolution of plant and animal life. It was Darwin's great achievement to have brought into the focus of a hypothesis the knowledge accumulated in the separate "comparative" fields, and to have "sorted out," in a more satisfactory manner than his predecessors, the factors of biological evolution. Similarly, we have today a whole series of specialized sciences relating to man—of which linguistics, mythology, folklore, ethnology, and anthropology by no means exhaust the list; and, further, though vague unverifiable theories of "progress" continue to multiply, there have not been wanting hypotheses of a more scientific character in regard to the factors of human evolution.

Yet, notwithstanding all these indications of activity, it must still be confessed that the study of Human Evolution is far from showing that vitality which might be expected in a subject of such evident importance. There is today the same insistence on the value of "facts," and the same resentment of "theory" that characterized the biologists and geologists of a century ago; but now the fault lies with the "historian."

Still another difficulty needs must be referred to. The modern historical scholar is in the position of proclaiming that "the whole evolution of human society is the province of history. It embraces," he says, "not political evolution alone, but the history of religion and philosophy, of literature and art, of trade and industry. There is not a side of the multifarious activity of man which the historian can safely neglect, for there is nothing that man thinks or does, or hopes or fears, but leaves its mark on the society in which he lives." 81 The historian is, however,

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81 G. W. Prothero, Why should we learn History? (Edinburgh, 1894), p. 8.
but one of many claimants to this wide domain. Mr. Andrew Lang, a quarter-century ago, was engaging his enthusiasm in the cause of Comparative Anthropology, "a new science which," he said, "had come into existence, the science which studies man in the sum of all his works and thoughts, as evolved through the whole process of his development." 82 Today, "Anthropology," in the view of Professor Myres, "is the Science of Man; its full task is nothing less than this, to observe and record, to classify and interpret, all the activities of all the varieties of this species of living being." 83 So, too, Mr. Marett, with promotive ardor, expresses the opinion that "Anthropology is the whole history of man as fired and pervaded by the idea of evolution. Man in evolution—that is the subject in its full reach. Anthropology studies man as he occurs at all known times. It studies him as he occurs in all known parts of the world. It studies him body and soul together—as a bodily organism, subject to conditions operating in time and space, which bodily organism is in intimate relation with a soul-life, also subject to those same conditions. Having an eye to such conditions from first to last, it seeks to plot out the general series of the changes, bodily and mental together, undergone by man in the course of his history." 84

The truth is, such visions are inspiring, are even, in a way, essential; but, to come down abruptly, they are no substitute for method. The student of every "human" discipline catches glimpses at times of the results that would accrue from the foundation of a Science of Man, and promptly lays claim, in anticipation, to the reward, in the name of the study he happens to represent. The situation, however, does not admit of claims; and "as regards the word," let us agree with Mr. Marett, and "call it a science, or history, or anthropology, or anything else." Let us recognise that the need of the present moment is not the

logical delimitation of spheres, but a working hypothesis for the evolution of mankind. Let us follow Darwin, not, however, by trying to adapt his theory to an evolution for which it was not designed, but by applying to our own problems, as he did, the method of James Hutton. Let us take counsel of the fact that Darwin's contribution—which must ever elicit our highest admiration—was made possible by the results previously achieved in the special biological sciences, and recognise that, for our needs, there exists the great body of knowledge already accumulated by the special sciences of Man. Let us, moreover, find encouragement in the known effect that Darwin's hypothesis produced upon the different branches of biological study. "A still more important consequence," M. Giard says, "resulted from these new conceptions. The theory of descent introduced into the biological sciences a unity of view, a community of end, which established among them the closest relations of mutual dependence and suppressed all futile questions of supremacy or of precedence." 85 So, it is not unwarrantable to infer, the common effort to define the processes manifested in Human Evolution would tend, in like manner, to bring into co-ordination the separate branches of inquiry which have for their object the study of the distinguishing activities of human kind.

6

The historical scholar, it is not improbable, may feel that the present discussion has run far beyond the scope and possibility of his own inquiries; hence the situation that confronts him must, if possible, be made clear.

The ideal of nineteenth century scholarship was that the historian should tell the exact truth in regard to what had happened in the past without political or philosophical prepossessions.

Thus Palacky, in 1836, prefaced his History of Bohemia with the notable statement: "As regards the principles and intentions which have

85 A. M. Giard, Congress of Arts and Science, St. Louis, 1904 (Boston, 1906), V, 261.
Teggart: Prolegomena to History

guided me while working at this history, I have hardly a word to say. I know of no others, except those that proceed naturally from the supreme principle of regard for historical truth and faith. That I write from the standpoint of a Bohemian is a fact for which I could only be blamed, if it rendered me unjust either to the Bohemians or to their opponents. I hope, however, that my sincere craving for truth, my respect for all laws, divine and human, my zeal for order and legality, my sympathy with the weal and woe of all mankind, will preserve me from the sin of partiality. With God's help, these principles will continue to guide me in my task."  

Of late, however, historians, like Mandell Creighton, have come to see, what Bradley pointed out thirty years ago, that "a history without so-called prejudices is a mere delusion." The perception of this fact must of necessity bring the historian to inquire anew, and with a more open mind, into the nature and office of historiography. Now, the result of such an inquiry shows, in the first place, that historiography stands in a unique relation to the spirit of nationality. The historian is memory's mouthpiece for his countrymen; and history is the inspiration of the patriot. So conceived, history (that is, historiography) is a form of literature, a genre which claims a high seriousness in its devotees, and which evokes a deep response in the hearts of men. Furthermore, the result of an inquiry into the nature of historiography reveals it as standing in an important relation to the highest aspirations of the human spirit. The historian, from considering the history of his own country, passes on to describe the rise and decline of empires; he presents, in his ultimate synthesis, momentous occurrences that have affected  

86 As quoted in Count Lützow's Lectures on the Historians of Bohemia (London, 1905), p. 94.  
87 F. H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical History (Oxford, 1874), pp. 5, 6. "The historian," he says, "is not and cannot be merely receptive, or barely reproductive. It is true that he may not actually add any new material of his own, and yet his action, in so far as he realises that which never as such has been given him, implies a preconception, and denotes in a sense a foregone conclusion. The straightening of the crooked rests on the knowledge of the straight, and the exercise of criticism requires a canon. This is not the only difficulty which historical writing in its practice brings to the theory of passivity.... With every fresh standing-ground gained by the growth of experience, with every rise of the spirit to a fuller life comes another view of the far-lying past from a higher and a new level, and a fresh and corresponding change in the features of the object recognised."
the destinies of the entire human race, and inevitably incorporates in his construction an answer of some sort to the question, "What does it all mean?" Thus consciously or unconsciously he arrives at the standpoint of Philosophy, and wittingly or unwittingly essays an explanation of its central problem; and Professory Bury quite properly reaches the conclusion that, as history-writers, "our apprehension of history and our reason for studying it must be ultimately determined by the view we entertain of the moles et machina mundi as a whole."

Nevertheless, high as we may rate the practice of historiography, neither as art nor as philosophy does it set problems for research or provide an outlet for the energies and ambitions of modern investigators. The work of art or the philosophical explanation, once created, lives on as a monument, independent of any subsequent extension of knowledge, to give pleasure or excite admiration, to be praised or condemned, as the case may be—but as an obstacle, not as an incitement, to further research. So the future progress of historical investigation turns upon the possibility of scholars being able to free their work from the domination of historiography.

But the aim of nineteenth century scholarship to investigate the history of mankind without prepossessions is not to be abandoned merely because the proper mode for the statement of its results has not yet been achieved. The failure of "history" to become a science has been due primarily to the subordination of investigation to history-writing, and, knowing this, the failure may be retrieved if the investigator will cease merely to declare that "history is a science," and set himself consciously to apply scientific methods to the subject-matter with which he is concerned. Science, as we have seen, is the systematic investigation of the processes manifested in phenomena, and this is the only method that can satisfy the ambition, or provide an outlet for the activity of the investigator.

The contrast here emphasised has long been recognized in at least one of the specialised fields of historical inquiry. Speaking of the course of philological study in the nineteenth century, Hanns Oertel says: "By
far the greatest part of all investigations in the historical sciences has been borne along by one of two main currents of thought. Both of them have their beginnings at the opening of the century which has just closed, but they spring from different sources, they pursue different ends, they employ different methods. These two chief tendencies may perhaps best be called the one synthetic, the other analytic.

The synthetic conception of Philology has its first and foremost representative in Friedrich August Wolf and is admirably outlined by him in an essay published in 1807. . . . Wolf conceived of Philology as the Biography of a Nation. . . . The chief characteristics of his conception of philology are these. First and foremost its synthetic nature. It examines the individual remains of antiquity as to their genuineness, it cleanses them from blemishes by which, in the course of time, they have become defaced, it gives to each an adequate interpretation. . . . It takes them as they are. . . . And it is for this reason that Wolf's Philology is an art, in the Aristotelian sense of τέχνη. Aristotle, in the Poetics (xxv, 1), distinguishes three kinds of poetic μῦσις namely, of things as they were or are, of things as they are said to be, and of an unrealized ideal. The philological μῦσις is of the first kind. It differs from that of the poet in that the latter freely constructs from true elements an imaginary composite whole, be it characters or incidents, which has never so existed and may therefore ever exist, while the Wolfian philologist carefully reconstructs from their elements actual characters and events as they have really existed. Such reconstruction requires artistic perspective, a well-planned arrangement of parts in order to produce the desired effect, a proper foreshortening. . . . Proportion is the very essence of art, and only by a constant reference to the whole can the proper place and value be assigned to each element. . . . Wolf's philology, then, has two sides: the one turned toward the spectator, the other turned toward the artist-philologist. . . . He who would successfully accomplish Wolf's purpose must unite two distinct qualities, namely, the critical for the preliminary preparation of his material and the artistic for its final composition. . . . Neither criticism nor hermeneutics can ever be an end in itself. They are the necessary substratum for all further work; they are not sciences by themselves, but parts of sciences, initial stages which are intended to lead up to something else. Without first hewing the beams no building can be erected; but who would hew beams except to erect a building?''

"This same material may, however, be viewed from another point, and this is the second aspect in which historical objects have, in the century past, presented themselves. In contradistinction to Wolf's synthesis this second attitude of the mind may be termed analytical. The contrast of the two methods is sharply marked. The central figure for Wolf is one nation; for the analytical investigator the central figure is some one of the many intellectual manifestations without reference to any particular nation, non quid sed quid. These homogeneous facts
he sets out to analyze in order to discover the laws which underlie the development of the phenomena which make up this particular group."

The failure of nineteenth-century historical scholarship has been due in some measure also to the arbitrary limitation of the investigator's outlook, consequent upon his preoccupation with documentary evidence. By insensible degrees, however, the historian has come to see that there is no hard and fast boundary between "historic" and "prehistoric" times, between "historical" and "unhistorical" peoples; the history of Man includes man everywhere and at all times. Furthermore, the historian has come to see that "history" cannot be confined to any one set of happenings or to any one category of facts. It must, therefore, be admitted that, in reality, Anthropology and History differ only in so far as each represents the use of a special investigative technique.

The widening outlook of both anthropologists and historians, then, as well as the requirements of science, demands the co-ordination of these two phases of humanistic inquiry; and yet it is clear that the technique of the Abbé Breuil is not interchangeable with that of Mr. Round. In this dilemma, it becomes necessary to consider the relations subsisting between specialists in other historical fields, such as Geology and Biology. Differences of technique in these subjects interpose no obstacle to the orderly prosecution of an evolutionary investigation; and it requires but a cursory examination, say of the work of Charles Darwin, to realise that the co-ordination of the various aspects of biological study is a result of the general acceptance of a common aim, namely, the discovery of the processes manifested in biological evolution.

Here in our progress we are seemingly at fault, for while the unity of aim in the biological sciences was created by Darwin's theory of Natural Selection, in the humanistic sciences no equally acceptable hypothesis has yet been formulated. If,

89 The present study concerns itself only with questions of method, and designedly omits all criticism or discussion of the many general
however, for the moment, we might assume that a working hypothesis had been stated, an inference may be drawn as to the effect of this upon the activities of the historical investigator: he would continue to employ the same investigative technique, and would confine his researches to the same area as before, but the aim and spirit of his inquiries would have undergone a complete change. His object would no longer be the creation of an aesthetic or philosophical synthesis of a complete whole, but the isolation and determination of the processes manifested in the phenomena with which he deals; he would continue his critical investigation of facts, but always with a view to their bearing upon the central problem of Human Evolution.

We have learned, of late, that "impartiality" in historiography is a mistaken ideal. We may now see that through the application of the method of science to the facts of history prejudice in favor of one's own people would give place to the Stoic view that "all men living, or who once lived, belong to the common human family," and we may see how the ambition to contribute, in however minor a degree, to the solution of the well-nigh insuperable problem that confronts mankind would tend to supplant, in the minds of scholars, the war-compelling spirit of nationality. In the past, the historiographer has been a chief exponent of emotions that eventually find expression in conflict; it remains to be seen whether the historical investigator may not, in the future, contribute to an understanding of the processes manifested in the activities of mankind. It is pre-eminently for the investigator to realise that "Upon this generation of students is laid the task of finding for history its proper place both in science and in education."  

The widespread existence of such an attitude is exemplified in the Papers on Inter-Racial Problems communicated to the First Universal Races Congress, London, 1911.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX

I. 1. The Method of Science
2. The Relation of Philosophy to Science

II. The Problems of Historiography
1. Historical Investigation and Historiography
   a. Greek and Roman Historiography
   b. Medieval Historiography
   c. Modern Historiography
2. Histories of the Philosophy of History
3. History in Current Philosophical Discussion

III. The Comparative Method

The bibliographical memoranda which follow are not presented as a conspectus of the literature of the subjects referred to, but are offered as a selection in further illustration of the matters dealt with in the text. The titles are arranged in chronological order.

I

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